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Construction Defects: Are They “Occurrences”?
Christopher C. French*
ABSTRACT
A frequently litigated issue in recent years in the area of insurance law is whether 
construction defects are “occurrences” under Commercial General Liability (“CGL”) 
insurance policies.  The courts have been divided both in deciding this issue and in 
their approaches to analyzing it.  This article addresses how the issue should be 
analyzed and concludes that construction defects are “occurrences.”
The relevant rules of insurance policy interpretation dictate that construction 
defects are “occurrences.”  Policy language should be interpreted so as to fulfill the 
reasonable expectations of the policyholder when the policy is construed as a whole 
with all ambiguities in the policy language resolved in favor of the policyholder.  
“Occurrence” is defined in CGL policies as an “accident,” including continuous or 
repeated exposure to harmful conditions.  The term “accident” itself, however, is 
undefined.  The common law provides that an “accident” is an event or happening 
that unexpectedly and unintentionally results in injury or property damage.  Thus, in 
determining whether construction defects are “occurrences,” the analysis should 
focus on whether the faulty workmanship and resulting damage was expected or 
intended by the contractor/policyholder.  If the faulty workmanship and resulting 
damage was unexpected and unintended by the contractor, as is typically the case, 
then the resulting construction defects, and any related property damage, were caused 
by an “occurrence.”  
Such a result is consistent with contractors’ reasonable expectations regarding the 
coverage they think they are purchasing under CGL policies.  Contractors reasonably 
expect that when they purchase CGL insurance to cover their business liabilities, they 
will receive coverage for liability claims relating to property damage arising out of 
their business activities.  Such claims are often the result of alleged construction 
defects.  Thus, if construction defects were not “occurrences” under CGL policies, 
then CGL policies would unfairly and impermissibly provide illusory coverage to 
contractors.
Finally, if construction defects were not “occurrences,” then the “business risk” 
exclusions found in CGL policies, which purport to exclude coverage for certain risks 
* Christopher C. French is a partner at K&L Gates LLP in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, and an Adjunct Professor of Insurance Law at Duquesne Law School; J.D., 
Harvard Law School; B.A., Columbia University.  The author gratefully acknowledges the 
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inherent in doing business, would be superfluous.  Thus, construing CGL policies as a 
whole also leads to the conclusion that construction defects are “occurrences.” 
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most litigated issues in the area of insurance law in recent years is 
whether construction defects constitute “occurrences” under Commercial General 
Liability (“CGL”) policies.1 “Occurrence” is defined under standard form CGL 
policies, which are currently used by most insurers, as follows:
[A]n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the 
same general harmful conditions.2
Notably, the term “accident” is not defined.
To put the issue of whether construction defects are “occurrences” in context, 
imagine the following scenario which plays out across America on a daily basis: A 
contractor, who has CGL insurance, uses a subcontractor to install or replace a roof 
on a person’s house.  Six months later, water starts leaking through the roof and 
causes damage to the walls and interior of the house.  The homeowner sues the 
contractor, who then turns to its CGL insurer to cover the claim.  The insurer denies 
coverage for the claim on the basis that the defective roof installation allegedly does 
not constitute an “occurrence” under the policy.
In essence, the insurer’s argument is that construction defects, such as the 
defective roof in the above example, are not “occurrences” because claims related to 
faulty workmanship are reasonably foreseeable, and thus they are not “accidents.”  
Insurers also argue that allowing coverage for construction defects would convert 
CGL policies into performance bonds or a guaranty regarding the quality of work 
performed, which is not the purpose of liability insurance.
The contractor’s response to such arguments, in the roofing example, is that the 
contractor did not intend to install the roof defectively; thus, the defective work was 
done accidentally and should be covered.  The contractor would also argue that it 
expected the CGL policy to cover claims asserted against it and its business.  Indeed, 
if construction defect claims are not covered, then why would a contractor even buy 
CGL insurance? 
This article addresses this issue and answers the question of whether construction 
defects are “occurrences” under CGL policies.  In short, the answer is “yes,” 
construction defects are “occurrences.”  As an initial matter, allowing recovery for 
construction defect claims would not convert CGL policies into performance bonds.  
Performance bonds and insurance provide financial security to different entities.  
Performance bonds are issued to assure the owner of the property that the 
construction work will be completed, while CGL policies insure the contractor 
1. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
2. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., FORM NO. CG 00 01 12 04, COMMERCIAL GENERAL 
LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM § V(13), at 14 (2004), reprinted in DONALD S. MALECKI &
ARTHUR L. FLITNER, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY app. I (8th ed. 2005).
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against third party claims and lawsuits.3 Whether a performance bond or an 
insurance policy covers a claim requires a separate, independent analysis of the facts 
and the language in each agreement at issue, and it is possible that one, both, or 
neither of them would cover the claim.  They are simply different agreements.  
Under the rules of insurance policy interpretation, such as contra proferentem,
the “reasonable expectations” doctrine, and construing the policy as a whole, there 
should be little debate that construction defects are “occurrences.”  “Occurrences” are 
accidents, “including continuous or repeated exposure” to harmful conditions, that 
unexpectedly and unintentionally result in injury or damage.4 Because the term 
“accident” is not defined in CGL policies, any ambiguities in its meaning when 
applied to construction defect claims should be construed in favor of the 
policyholder/contractor under the doctrine of contra proferentem.5 Contractors 
generally do not intend their workmanship to be faulty or defective.  Nor do they 
generally expect that their work will result in property damage.  Thus, when 
construction work is done defectively, it generally is an “accident.”
In addition, contractors who purchase CGL insurance do so with the expectation 
that liability claims asserted against them, most commonly for construction defects, 
will be covered under the CGL policies they purchase.  This expectation is reasonable 
because contractors are in the construction business; consequently, their liabilities 
typically relate to their construction work. 
Moreover, when CGL policies are construed as a whole, one also is led to the 
conclusion that construction defects are “occurrences.”  If construction defects were 
not “occurrences,” then the “business risk” exclusions, which purport to exclude 
coverage for certain risks inherent in doing business, would be superfluous.6  
Consequently, in order for the “business risk” exclusions to have any purpose or 
meaning in the context of a policyholder in the construction business, construction 
defects must constitute “occurrences” so long as the construction defects are not 
expected or intended by the policyholder.  Thus, the determination of whether any 
particular construction defect claim is covered under a CGL policy ultimately should 
turn on the application of the specific facts of the claim to the language in the 
“business risk” exclusions, not on an analysis of whether construction defects are 
“occurrences.”
This article analyzes the issue of whether construction defects are “occurrences” 
in four parts.  Part I discusses the relevant policy language, such as the definitions of 
“occurrence” and “property damage,” as well as the “business risk” exclusions 
contained in CGL policies.  Part II addresses the principles of insurance policy 
interpretation relevant to the determination of whether construction defects are 
“occurrences.”  Part III discusses the courts’ treatment of the issue and the various 
3. See infra notes 172-175 and accompanying text.
4. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 2. 
5. See discussion infra Part II.A.
6. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
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approaches that courts have taken in resolving the issue.  Part IV sets forth the 
author’s views regarding how courts should be resolving the issue.  The article then 
concludes with a summary of the reasons why construction defects are 
“occurrences.”
I. THE RELEVANT POLICY LANGUAGE
A.  The Insuring Agreement
Under the Insurance Services Office, Inc.’s (“ISO”)7 current standard form CGL 
policy, the basic insuring agreement language is as follows:
COVERAGE ABODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
1.  Insuring Agreement
a.  We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay 
as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this 
insurance applies. . . .
. . . . 
b.  This insurance applies to “bodily injury” and “property damage” only if:
(1)  The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is caused by an 
“occurrence” that takes place in the “coverage territory” . . . .8
B. The Fortuity Doctrine and the Definition of “Occurrence”
The use of the term “occurrence” in CGL policies actually has its origins in the 
fortuity doctrine, which first appeared in the property insurance context and 
essentially provides that insurance only covers “fortuitous” losses.9 Quoting 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
has explained that a loss is fortuitous if it “occur[s] by chance without evident causal 
need or relation or without deliberate intention.”  The court further described a 
fortuitous event as an event that is “not certain to occur.”10  
7. ISO is an influential organization within the insurance industry that promulgates 
standard form insurance policies, including CGL policies that insurers across the country use 
to conduct their business. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 879 n.6 
(Fla. 2007).  In particular, the organization develops its own standard forms and makes them 
available with state insurance regulators. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 
764, 772 (1993).  Being comprised of about 1400 insurers of property and casualty, ISO “is 
the almost exclusive source of support services in this country for CGL insurance.” Id. As a 
result, “most CGL insurance written in the United States is written on [ISO] forms.” Id.
8. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 2, § I(1)(a), (b)(1), at 1.
9. See, e.g., Avis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 195 S.E.2d 545, 548 (N.C. 1973).
10. Avis, 195 S.E.2d at 548.
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Other courts have described “fortuity” as the “loss of property or possession, ‘by 
some unexpected acts’”;11 “an event dependent on chance”;12 “‘[h]appening by 
accident or chance; unplanned’”;13 and “a casualty.”14
The original Restatement of Contracts defines “fortuity” in the insurance context 
as follows:
A fortuitous event . . . is an event which so far as the parties to the contract are 
aware, is dependent on chance.  It may be beyond the power of any human 
being to bring the event to pass; it may be within the control of third persons; it 
may even be a past event, as the loss of a vessel, provided that the fact is 
unknown to the parties.15
The fortuity doctrine subsequently made its way into liability policies when it 
began being included in the definition of “occurrence.” For many years, 
“occurrence” was defined in ISO’s standard form CGL policies as follows:
[A]n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which 
results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from 
the standpoint of the insured . . . .16
The current version of ISO’s standard form CGL policy defines “occurrence” as:
[A]n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the 
same general harmful conditions.17
11. Klockner Stadler Hurter Ltd. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 780 F. Supp. 148, 157 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting London & Provincial Leather Processes, Ltd. v. Hudson, [1939] 
K.B. 724 at 730 (Eng.)).
12. Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Sturge, 684 F. Supp. 359, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff’d, 
848 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 870 F.2d 148, 
151 (4th Cir. 1989); Intermetal Mexicana, S.A. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 866 F.2d 71, 77 (3d 
Cir. 1989); Standard Structural Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 597 F. Supp. 164, 193 
(D. Conn. 1984). 
13. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Linard, 498 F.2d 556, 563 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 518 (William Morris ed., 
1970)).
14. Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 643 F. Supp. 1030, 1042 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
15. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 291 cmt. a (1932); see also Compagnie des 
Bauxites de Guinee v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 724 F.2d 369, 372 (3d Cir. 1983); Mattis v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 454 N.E.2d 1156, 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
16. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., GENERAL INSURING AGREEMENT 1 (1973) (emphasis 
added), reprinted in MALECKI & FLITNER, supra note 2, at app. A.  
17. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 2. 
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The “expected or intended” language that was contained in the old definition of 
“occurrence” has been moved to the exclusions section of the policies:
This insurance does not apply to . . . “[b]odily injury” or “property damage” 
expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.18
Thus, depending on the year the policy was issued, the “expected or intended” 
language may appear in the exclusions section of the policy or in the definition of 
“occurrence.”
C.  The Definition of “Property Damage”
“Property damage” is defined in standard form CGL policies as follows:
a.  Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that 
property. . . . ; or
b.  Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured.19
D.  The “Business Risk” Exclusions
Under ISO’s 1973 CGL policy form, there were three exclusions commonly 
referred to as the “business risk” exclusions, which purport to eliminate coverage for 
risks inherent in doing business and were worded as follows:
This [insurance] does not apply . . . :
. . . . 
(n)  to property damage to the named insured’s products arising out of such 
products or any part of such products;
(o)  to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named insured 
arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or 
equipment furnished in connection therewith;
(p)  to damages claimed for the withdrawal, inspection, repair, replacement, or 
loss of use of the named insured’s products or work completed by or for the 
named insured or of any property of which such products or work form a part, if 
such products, work or property are withdrawn from the market or from use 
because of any known or suspected defect or deficiency therein . . . .20
18. Id. § I(2)(a), at 2.
19. Id. § V(17)(a)-(b), at 14-15.
20. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., FORM NO. GL 00 02 01 73, COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL 
LIABILITY INSURANCE § I(n)-(p), at 2 (1973), reprinted in MALECKI & FLITNER, supra note 2,
at app. A. 
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Since 1973, the “business risk” exclusions have been redrafted to narrow the 
scope of the exclusions.21 Beginning in 1976, policyholders could purchase what 
was referred to as a Broad Form Property Endorsement that replaced, among other 
exclusions, Exclusion (o) with an exclusion that expanded coverage.22  
In 1986, the “business risk” exclusions were revised again to incorporate the 
Broad Form Property Endorsement into the policy itself, clarify the language in the 
business risk exclusions, and add an exception for work done by subcontractors.23  
Since 1986, the business risk exclusions have been worded as follows:
This insurance does not apply to:
. . . . 
k.  Damage to Your Product 
“Property damage” to “your product” arising out of it or any part of it.
l.  Damage to Your Work
“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it or any part of it and 
included in the “products-completed operations hazard.”
This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of 
which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor.
m.  Damage to Impaired Property or Property Not Physically Injured
“Property damage” to “impaired property” or property that has not been 
physically injured, arising out of: 
(1)  A defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in “your 
product” or “your work”; or 
(2)  A delay or failure by you or anyone acting on your behalf to 
perform a contract or agreement in accordance with its terms.
This exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of other property 
arising out of sudden and accidental physical injury to “your product” 
or “your work” after it has been put to its intended use.24
According to one commentator, the subcontractor exception was added because
the insurance and policyholder communities agreed that the CGL policy should 
provide coverage for defective construction claims so long as the allegedly 
defective work had been performed by a subcontractor rather than the 
policyholder itself.  This resulted both because of the demands of the 
policyholder community (which wanted this sort of coverage) and the view of 
21. See 21 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D § 132.9[B], 
at 148-50 (2002).
22. See id.  
23. See id. § 132.9[C]-[D], at 150-53; see also INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 2, 
§ I(2)(j)-(l), (n), at 4-5.
24. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 2, § I(2)(k)-(m)(2), at 5; see also INS. SERVS.
OFFICE, INC., FORM NO. CG 00 01 07 98, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM 
§ I(2)(k)-(m)(2) (1998), as reprinted in HOLMES, supra note 21, § 132.9[A], at 145-46. 
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insurers that the CGL was a more attractive product that could be better sold if it 
contained this coverage.25
ISO itself, through a July 15, 1986 circular, stated that the 1986 revisions to the 
“business risk” exclusions were intended to incorporate the 1976 Broad Form 
Property Endorsement and to make it clear that the policy “‘cover[ed] damage caused 
by faulty workmanship to other parts of work in progress; and damage to, or caused 
by, a subcontractor’s work after the insured’s operations are completed.’”26
II.  PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION RELEVANT TO THE 
DETERMINATION OF WHETHER CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS ARE “OCCURRENCES”
When courts are asked to interpret and apply policy language, such as the 
definition of “occurrence” and the “expected or intended” language, three well-
established rules of policy interpretation emerge as particularly relevant to the 
analysis: (1) contra proferentem, (2) the doctrine of “reasonable expectations,” and 
(3) construction of the policy as a whole.
A. The Doctrine of Contra Proferentem
It is hornbook insurance law that because insurers are the drafters of policy 
language, the doctrine of contra proferentem applies, which means any ambiguities in 
the policy language should be construed against the insurers and in favor of 
coverage.27 The test under many states’ laws for determining whether policy 
25. 2 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 14.13[D], at 14-
224.8 (3d ed. Supp. 2007).
26. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 879 (Fla. 2007) (alteration in 
original) (quoting INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., CIRCULAR NO. 6L-86-204, COMMERCIAL 
GENERAL LIABILITY PROGRAM INSTRUCTIONS (1986)).
27. See, e.g., 1 ELIZABETH K. AINSLIE ET AL., BUSINESS INSURANCE LAW AND 
PRACTICE GUIDE § 2.02[1], at 2-37 to -39 (2009); 13 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN 
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7401, at 197 (1976); 4 ROWLAND H. LONG,
THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 16.04, at 16-20, § 16.06, at 16-27 (2009); 1 BARRY R.
OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES
§ 1.03[b][1], at 30-32 (15th ed. Supp. 2011); 2 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 
3D § 22:14, at 22-67 to -70 (rev. ed. 2010); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 5.1, at 173 (1994); David B. Goodwin, Disputing Insurance 
Coverage Disputes, 43 STAN. L. REV. 779, 795 (1991) (book review); see also New Castle 
County v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 243 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2001) (“When 
policy language is ambiguous, . . . under Delaware law this Court must apply the doctrine of 
contra proferentem.  That is, ambiguous language must be construed against the drafter and 
in conformance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.”); Kunin v. Benefit Trust 
Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1990) (“According to the law of California and, 
indeed, every other state as well as the District of Columbia, ambiguities in insurance 
contracts must be construed against the insurer.” (footnote omitted)); Keller v. Safeco Ins. 
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Co. of Am., 877 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ark. 1994) (“If there is a reasonable construction that may 
be given to the contract that would justify recovery, it is the duty of the court to adopt it.”); 
Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 485 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Cal. 1971) (“Any ambiguity or 
uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved against the insurer.”); Hecla Mining Co. 
v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Colo. 1991) (finding the term “sudden” to be 
ambiguous, and construing the phrase “sudden and accidental” against the insurer to mean 
“unexpected and unintended”); Ceci v. Nat’l Indem. Co., 622 A.2d 545, 548-51 (Conn. 
1993) (finding “family member” ambiguous and defining it to favor the insured); Cody v. 
Remington Elec. Shavers, 427 A.2d 810, 812 (Conn. 1980) (“[A]mbiguities in contract 
documents are resolved against the party responsible for its drafting.”); Phillips Home 
Builders, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 700 A.2d 127, 129 (Del. 1997) (“If there is an ambiguity, 
however, the contract language is construed most strongly against the insurance company 
that drafted it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc. v. Nat’l 
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 821 A.2d 323, 328 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“To the extent an 
ambiguity does exist, the doctrine of contra preferentum requires that the language be 
construed most strongly against the insurance company that drafted it.”); Crawford v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 P.2d 900, 904 (Kan. 1989) (“Since an insurer prepares its 
own contracts, it has a duty to make the meaning clear, and if it fails to do so, the insurer, 
and not the insured, must suffer.”); RPM Pizza, Inc. v. Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 601 So. 2d 1366, 
1369 (La. 1992) (“[A]ny ambiguity must be construed against the insurance company and in 
favor of the reasonable construction that affords coverage.”); Me. Drilling & Blasting, Inc. v. 
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 665 A.2d 671, 673 (Me. 1995) (“A liability insurance policy must be 
construed to resolve all ambiguities in favor of coverage.”); Am. Bumper & Mfg. Co. v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 550 N.W.2d 475, 480 (Mich. 1996) (“[I]n construing insurance 
contracts, any ambiguities are strictly construed against the insurer to maximize coverage.”); 
Weaver v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 674 A.2d 975, 977 (N.H. 1996) (“If the policy language is 
ambiguous or where conflicting interpretations exist, we construe the policy in favor of 
providing coverage to the insured.”); Allen v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 208 A.2d 638, 644 (N.J. 
1965) (“[P]olicies should be construed liberally in their favor to the end that coverage is 
afforded to the full extent that any fair interpretation will allow.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flanagin, 210 A.2d 221, 226 (N.J. 1965) (“If the controlling 
language will support two meanings, one favorable to the insurer, and the other favorable to 
the insured, the interpretation sustaining coverage must be applied.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); State v. Home Indem. Co., 486 N.E.2d 827, 829 (N.Y. 1985) (“If . . . the 
language in the insurance contract is ambiguous and susceptible of two reasonable 
interpretations, the parties may submit extrinsic evidence as an aid in construction, and the 
resolution of the ambiguity is for the trier of fact.”); DeBerry v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 236 
S.E.2d 380, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (“[A]ny ambiguity or uncertainty as to the meaning of 
terms in a policy should be resolved against the insurer since it selected the language used.”); 
Kief Farmers Coop. Elevator Co. v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 28, 32 (N.D. 1995) 
(explaining that in construing policies, a court must “balance the equities in favor of 
providing coverage to the insured”); Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 436 N.E.2d 
1347, 1348-49 (Ohio 1982) (“[P]olicies of insurance, which are in language selected by the 
insurer and which are reasonably open to different interpretations, will be construed most 
favorably for the insured.” (alternation in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sec. 
Fin. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 269 N.E.2d 592, 594 (Ohio 1971) (“[I]n construing provisions of 
insurance policies a court must resolve any doubts arising from the language used in favor of 
the insured and . . . if the words used in the policy bear more than one reasonable meaning, 
they should be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured.” (internal quotation marks 
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language is ambiguous is whether the provisions at issue are reasonably or fairly 
susceptible to different interpretations or meanings.28 Where the controversy 
omitted)); Cohen v. Erie Indem. Co., 432 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (concluding, 
in the face of conflicting authorities, that the clause at issue was ambiguous regarding 
whether coverage extended to the particular facts at hand, and that such ambiguity alone 
required resolving the issue in favor of the insured driver); Shelley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 245 A.2d 674, 675-76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968) (“It is well established that an insurance 
policy will be construed most strongly against the insurer who has prepared it . . . .”); Nat’l 
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. 1991) 
(“[I]f a contract of insurance is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, [the 
court] must resolve the uncertainty by adopting the construction that most favors the 
insured.”); Garneau v. Curtis & Bedell, Inc., 610 A.2d 132, 134 (Vt. 1992) (“In determining 
whether the insurer has a duty to indemnify, any ambiguity in the insurance contract will be 
resolved in favor of the insured.”); Peerless Ins. Co. v. Wells, 580 A.2d 485, 487 (Vt. 1990) 
(“[A]ny ambiguity in policy language should be resolved in favor of the insured . . . .”); 
Murray v. W. Pac. Ins. Co., 472 P.2d 611, 615 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (“[T]he well 
recognized rule that exclusionary clauses in insurance policies are construed most strongly 
against the insurer.”).  
28. See APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 27, § 7403, at 312-13 (explaining that 
the insurer has the burden of establishing that the insurer’s interpretation is the only fair 
interpretation of the contract); LONG, supra note 27, § 16.06, at 16-35 (“Generally, a term or 
clause will be found ambiguous if it is subject to two or more reasonable constructions.”); 
see also New Castle County v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 243 F.3d 744, 750 
(3d Cir. 2001) (“The settled test for ambiguity is whether the provisions in controversy are 
reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more 
different meanings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); W. Heritage Ins. Co. v. Magic 
Years Learning Ctrs. & Child Care, Inc., 45 F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that under 
Texas law, “the court must enforce the policy as written if it can be given only one 
reasonable construction”); Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 839-40 (2d Cir. 
1981) (stating that New York law places a heavy burden on the insurer to prove that the 
policyholder’s interpretation is unreasonable, that the policy is “susceptible” to the insurer’s 
interpretation, and the insurer’s interpretation is the only one that could “fairly be placed” on 
the policy (internal quotation marks omitted)); Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
276, 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that policy language is ambiguous if it is 
susceptible to two or more meanings); Shepard v. Calfarm Life Ins. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 428, 
432-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that “a policy provision is ambiguous when it is 
capable of two or more constructions, both of which are reasonable,” and the burden of 
proving one reasonable construction falls to the insurer (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Phillips Home Builders, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 700 A.2d 127, 130 (Del. 1997) 
(“Convoluted or confusing terms are the problem of the insurer . . . not the insured.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 476 (N.H. 
1994) (“If the language of the policy reasonably may be interpreted more than one way and 
one interpretation favors coverage, an ambiguity exists in the policy that will be construed in 
favor of the insured and against the insurer.”); Salem Grp. v. Oliver, 607 A.2d 138, 139 (N.J. 
1992) (“When a policy fairly supports an interpretation favorable to both the insured and the 
insurer, the policy should be interpreted in favor of the insured.”); Harris, Jolliff & Michel, 
Inc. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 255 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) (“Where an 
ambiguity exists that meaning must be assigned which is most favorable to the insured and 
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involves a phrase that insurance companies have failed to define and has generated 
many lawsuits with varying results, common sense dictates that the policy language 
must be ambiguous.29
Further, because exclusions purport to limit coverage that otherwise is provided, 
they are to be narrowly construed and the insurer has the burden of proving they are 
applicable.30 Indeed, numerous courts have held that exclusions will not be 
which excludes the least.”); Bartlett v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 45, 47 (R.I. 1991) 
(noting ambiguity if a clause has “more than one reasonable meaning”); Goldstein v. 
Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 273 A.2d 318, 321 (R.I. 1971) (“The test to be applied by a 
court in determining the meaning of ambiguous terms in an insurance contract is not what 
the insurer intended by its words, but what the ordinary reader and purchaser applying for 
insurance would have understood them to mean.”); H.D. Bonner v. United Servs. Auto. 
Ass’n, 841 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (“The court must adopt the construction of 
an exclusionary clause urged by the insured as long as that construction is not unreasonable, 
even if the construction urged by the insurer appears to be more reasonable or a more 
accurate reflection of the parties’ intent.”).
29. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 243 F.3d 
744, 756 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding ambiguity where the contested phrase was not defined and 
had been interpreted differently by various courts); Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Investors 
Diversified Ltd., 407 So. 2d 314, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“The insurance company 
contends that the language is not ambiguous, but we cannot agree and offer as proof of that
pudding the fact that the Supreme Court of California and the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans 
have arrived at opposite conclusions from a study of essentially the same language.”); 
Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 P.2d 900, 908 (Kan. 1989) (“[T]he reported 
cases are in conflict, the trial judge and the Court of Appeals reached different conclusions 
and the justices of this court do not agree . . . .  Under such circumstances, the clause is, by 
definition, ambiguous and must be interpreted in favor of the insured.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 311 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (“Since we 
assume that all courts adopt a reasonable construction, the conflict is of itself indicative that 
the word as so used is susceptible of at least two reasonable interpretations, one of which 
extends the coverage to the situation at hand.”); George H. Olmsted & Co. v. Metro. Life 
Ins. Co., 161 N.E. 276, 277 (Ohio 1928) (surveying cases where courts have differed in their 
interpretation of the same language in insurance contracts and concluding that the language 
in this case is ambiguous); Cohen v. Erie Indem. Co., 432 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1981) (“The mere fact that . . . [courts differ on the construction of the provision] itself 
creates the inescapable conclusion that the provision in issue is susceptible to more than one 
interpretation.”); AINSLIE ET AL., supra note 27, § 2.02[1], at 2-38; LONG, supra note 27, 
§ 16.06, at 16-36; STEMPEL, supra note 27, § 5.8, at 201-02; Charles C. Marvel, Annotation,
Division of Opinion Among Judges on Same Court or Among Other Courts or Jurisdictions 
Considering Same Question, as Evidence that Particular Clause of Insurance Policy is 
Ambiguous, 4 A.L.R.4TH 1253, 1255 (1981).
30. See, e.g., SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Minn. 
1995) (explaining that the insurer has the burden to “prove the applicability of an exclusion 
as an affirmative defense”), overruled on other grounds by Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 
N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 2009); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Louis Marx & Co., 415 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ohio 
1980) (explaining that the insurer has the burden of proving a defense based on exclusion); 
Brown v. Snohomish Cnty. Physicians Corp., 845 P.2d 334, 340 (Wash. 1993) (explaining 
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interpreted and applied in such a way as to swallow the basic coverages provided 
under a policy.31
So how does contra proferentem apply in the context of determining whether 
construction defects are “occurrences”?  As discussed above, an ambiguous insurance 
policy provision is one that has more than one reasonable meaning.32 Here, the key 
term “accident” is not defined, and the courts have struggled to determine what the 
test should be with respect to whether an injury or damage is “expected or 
intended.”33 Thus, when one attempts to determine whether construction defects are 
“occurrences,” it becomes apparent that the term is ambiguous when applied in many 
instances.  Consequently, it should be construed against insurers in such cases.34
B. The “Reasonable Expectations” Doctrine
Another staple of insurance policy interpretation is that a policy should be 
interpreted in such a way as to fulfill the “reasonable expectations” of the 
policyholder.35 A seminal article regarding the “reasonable expectations” doctrine 
that once the insured has made a prima facie case that there is coverage, the burden shifts to 
the insurer to prove an exclusionary provision applies); AINSLIE ET AL., supra note 27, 
§ 2.02[1], at 2-39; APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 27, § 7405, at 340; PLITT ET AL., 
supra note 27, § 22:31, at 22-133.
31. See Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (concluding that a policy excluding acts explicitly covered in a prior section of the 
policy should be construed against the insurer); Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. 
Supp. 2d 376, 390 (D. Del. 2002) (explaining that construing ambiguities against the insurer 
reduces the insurer’s incentive to draft “provisions [that] purport to give coverage while 
other clauses take that very coverage away”); Titan Indem. Co. v. Newton, 39 F. Supp. 2d 
1336, 1348 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (finding some coverage even though “[t]he limitations of [the] 
policy completely swallow[ed] up the insuring provisions”); Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 
A.2d 1375, 1380 (Md. 1997) (“If the exclusion totally swallows the insuring provision, the 
provisions are completely contradictory.  That is the grossest form of ambiguity, and [the 
insurer], unquestionably, would be obliged to defend and indemnify.”). 
32. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra Part II.D.
34. See supra notes 27, 29 and accompanying text.
35. See AINSLIE ET AL., supra note 27, § 2.02[1], at 2-40; ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN 
I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(a)(3), at 633-34 (1988); LONG, supra note 27, § 16.07, at 
16-39; OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 27, § 1.03[b][2][B], at 42-53 (identifying courts in 
forty-two states that have expressed support for, or applied a form of, the reasonable 
expectations doctrine); PLITT ET AL., supra note 27, § 22:11, at 22-41; STEMPEL, supra note 
27, § 11.1, at 312; see also AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990) 
(explaining that ambiguous coverage clauses of insurance policies are to be interpreted 
“broadly, protecting the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured”); Roland v. Ga. 
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 462 S.E.2d 623, 625 (Ga. 1995) (“A contract of insurance 
should be strictly construed against the insurer and read in favor of coverage in accordance 
with the reasonable expectations of the insured.”); A.B.C. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Mut. Ins. 
Co., 661 A.2d 1187, 1190 (N.H. 1995) (“[T]he policy language must be so clear as to create 
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was written by then Professor Robert Keeton more than forty years ago.36 In his 
subsequent treatise, then Judge Keeton summarized the doctrine as follows:
In general, courts will protect the reasonable expectations of applicants, insureds, 
and intended beneficiaries regarding the coverage afforded by insurance 
contracts even though a careful examination of the policy provisions indicates 
that such expectations are contrary to the expressed intention of the insurer.37  
no ambiguity which might affect the insured’s reasonable expectations.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 824 P.2d 302, 308 (N.M. 
1992) (explaining that the court will “give[] effect to the insured’s reasonable expectations” 
in construing policy language); Mills v. Agrichem. Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 671-73 
(N.D. 1977) (explaining that the doctrine of reasonable expectations is properly invoked to 
discern the intentions of the parties and impose liability on the insurer); Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488, 495-96 (W. Va. 1987) (explaining that a court 
will apply the reasonable expectations doctrine to construe the policy in a manner that “a 
reasonable person standing in the shoes of the insured would expect the language to 
mean[,] . . . even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated 
those expectations” (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by
Potesta v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 504 S.E.2d 135 (W. Va. 1998)). 
36. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 961, 966-77 (1970).
37. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 35, § 6.3(a)(3), at 633.  For commentary regarding 
the reasonable expectations doctrine, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-
Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV.
1151, 1168-98 (1981) (outlining justifications for, and limitations of, the reasonable 
expectations doctrine); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in 
Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 825-26, 839-46 (1990) (providing 
a detailed historical account of the doctrine and asserting that the doctrine is principled and 
can be applied within justiciable guidelines); Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Contract, and 
the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 35-41 (1998) (discussing the 
doctrine as conceptualized by Keeton); William A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: 
Seeking a Principled Application, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267, 287-96 (1986) (formulating 
standards for applying the doctrine); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations 
Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323, 374-92 (1986) (arguing for refinements to the doctrine 
in response to the fading appeal that the doctrine holds for courts and commentators and 
contending that courts should “discard their unfortunate tendency to speak the platitudes of 
reasonable expectations without undertaking a careful and systematic analysis”).  While 
there is relatively broad acceptance of the doctrine, judicial interpretation and application of 
the doctrine is variable. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of 
the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 
CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 182-84, 191-95 (1998) (describing judicial approaches and noting both 
liberal and narrow approaches among the numerous states that have adopted the doctrine); 
Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729, 731-32 (2000) (exploring judicial 
responses and proposing that a “middle ground” approach has developed); Laurie Kindel 
Fett, Note, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Alternative to Bending and Stretching 
Traditional Tools of Contract Interpretation, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1113, 1124-33 
(1992) (exploring the doctrine under Minnesota law); Scott B. Krider, Comment, The 
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As Professor Francis Mootz more recently commented, the reasonable expectations 
doctrine provides that “even when the policy language unambiguously precludes 
coverage, under certain circumstances, courts will hold that coverage exists.”38
Stated differently, the policyholder should receive in coverage what it can 
objectively and reasonably expect to receive even if the insurer can point to some 
policy language that supports the insurer’s position that the claim at issue should not 
be covered.  Thus, for example, a policyholder in the construction business can 
reasonably expect it will receive coverage under a CGL policy for construction 
liability claims when it buys a CGL policy for purposes of insuring itself against 
liability claims.  
So what does this mean in the context of whether construction defects are 
“occurrences”?  As is discussed below in Part IV, a policyholder can reasonably 
expect to receive coverage for construction defects so long as it did not “expect or 
intend” its work to be defective and cause damage.  In other words, courts should not 
permit insurers to agree to cover property damage unexpectedly and unintentionally 
caused by a contractor or its subcontractor, but then, when a claim is presented, deny 
coverage based on the argument that all work done by a contractor or its 
subcontractor, whether defective or of high quality, is intentional and thus, it and any 
related property damage are not covered.  To do so would render the liability 
coverage provided to contractors under the policy illusory, which is impermissible.39
Reconstruction of Insurance Contracts Under the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 18 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 155, 157, 173-76 (1984) (arguing that regulatory efforts address the 
underlying problems in the insurance industry in a manner superior to judicial use of 
reasonable expectations); William Mark Lashner, Note, A Common Law Alternative to the 
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 1175, 1208 (1982) (proposing a rule that “any provision which undercuts the 
bargained-for insurance coverage must . . . be[] specifically explained to the insured” to be 
enforceable); Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations 
Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1475-87 (1989) (providing a “law and economics” 
critique of the doctrine).
38. Francis J. Mootz III, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination Claims, 
52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 22 (1997).
39. See, e.g., Bowersox Truck Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Harco Nat’l Ins. Co., 209 F.3d 
273, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting the insurer’s interpretation of the policy’s two-year 
limitation period where that interpretation would have rendered coverage illusory); Harris v. 
Gulf Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (rejecting the insurer’s 
interpretation of the exclusion in the policy because it “would render the coverage provided 
by the policy illusory”); Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 398 (D. 
Del. 2002) (rejecting a director and officer insurer’s interpretation of the policy’s deliberate 
fraud exclusion where, if applied, “there would be little or nothing left to that coverage” 
because “[n]o insured would expect such limited coverage from a policy that purports to 
cover all types of securities fraud claims”); Atofina Petrochems., Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 185 
S.W.3d 440, 444 (Tex. 2005) (rejecting an insurer’s interpretation of additional insured 
endorsement because doing so “would render coverage under the endorsement largely 
illusory”); see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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C.  Construction of the Policy as a Whole
The third policy interpretation principle applicable to the issue of whether 
construction defects are “occurrences” provides that, if possible, the policy should be 
interpreted in a way that reconciles the various provisions of the policy and attempts 
to give effect to all of the policy’s provisions.40 In essence, this principle means 
courts should attempt to interpret all of the policy’s provisions in a way that is 
consistent with the general purpose of the policy as a whole.  In the context of 
construction defects, this means that the definition of “occurrence” should not be read 
in isolation in determining whether a claim is covered.  To the contrary, courts should 
first look to the insuring language in the policy that incorporates the definition of 
“occurrence,” as well as the rest of the policy provisions, including the “business 
risk” exclusions, to determine whether the policy covers the claim at issue.  
As is discussed in Part IV, the fact that “business risk” exclusions are even 
provided for in CGL policies, including the subcontractor exception contained 
therein,41 should be considered when determining whether construction defects are 
intended to be covered.  Thus, when analyzing whether there is coverage for a claim, 
courts should not examine just a portion of the policy, such as the definition of 
“occurrence.”  Instead, the insurance policy should be read as a whole—keeping in 
mind that the basic purpose of insurance is to protect the policyholder from losses or 
liabilities in exchange for the payment of a premium.  To do otherwise would make 
the insurance illusory.42
40. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2(4) (2010) (providing that contracts should be 
interpreted as a whole); Rothenberg v. Lincoln Farm Camp, Inc., 755 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (applying New York law and finding “an interpretation that gives a reasonable 
and effective meaning to all the terms of a contract is generally preferred to one that leaves a 
part unreasonable or of no effect”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 286 Cal. 
Rptr. 146, 155-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“‘In short, an insurance contract is to be construed in 
a manner which gives meaning to all its provisions in a natural, reasonable, and practical 
manner, having reference to the risk and subject matter and to the purposes of the entire 
contract.’” (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crane, 266 Cal. Rptr. 422, 424-25 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990)); State Farm, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 424-25 (citing Barrett v. Farmers Ins. 
Grp., 220 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) to determine that “an insurance contract is 
to be construed in a manner which gives meaning to all its provisions in a natural, 
reasonable, and practical manner”); Barrett, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (construing an insurance 
contract to give meaning to all its provisions); Weiss v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 319 N.E.2d 
491, 495 (Ill. 1974) (explaining that the provisions of an insurance policy should be 
interpreted in the context of the entire policy); Welborn v. Ill. Nat’l Cas. Co., 106 N.E.2d 
142, 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952) (“[T]he court should determine the intention [of the parties] 
from the whole agreement, and endeavor to give a meaning to all provisions, so far as 
possible, which will render them consistent and operative.”).
41. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 2, § I(2)(l), at 5 (“This exclusion does not 
apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises was performed on 
your behalf by a subcontractor.”). 
42. See supra notes 31, 39 and accompanying text.  
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D. Issues Related to What Exactly Must Be “Expected or Intended”
In analyzing whether construction defects are “accidents,” the first thing one 
must keep in mind is that the “expected or intended” language contained in CGL 
policies, whether located in the definition of “occurrence” or in the exclusions section 
of the policy, is an exclusion.43 Thus, it should be narrowly construed44 and all 
ambiguities regarding its interpretation and application should be resolved in favor of 
the policyholder.45 Further, the insurer has the burden of proving the policyholder 
expected or intended the damage at issue.46
1.  Objective v. Subjective Standard
In applying the “expected or intended” language, one must examine the 
policyholder’s state of mind to determine whether the property damage was caused 
by an accident or whether the policyholder expected or intended to cause the damage 
at issue.  Courts do not agree if the test should be whether the policyholder 
subjectively expected or intended to cause the damage at issue, or objectively should 
have expected or intended to cause the damage at issue.47 The majority of courts to 
address the issue, however, have adopted a subjective standard.48
43. See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 
1205 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that the insurer has the burden of proof regarding “the 
exclusionary effect of policy language,” regardless of where the exclusionary language is 
located in the policy); Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 4:88-CV-124, 1994 WL 
1029337, at *9 (W.D. Mich. July 22, 1994) (“[A]lthough the neither expected nor intended 
language appears in the occurrence clause, it essentially operates as an exclusion.”); Clemco 
Indus. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 665 F. Supp. 816, 820-21 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 
(determining that the “expected or intended” language is an exclusionary clause, and thus 
requires a narrow interpretation to provide the insured the greatest protection); Nat’l Farmers 
Union Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kovash, 452 N.W.2d 307, 311 n.3 (N.D. 1990) (“A 
determination of coverage under the ‘expected or intended’ language in the definition of an 
occurrence generally involves the same determination as coverage under an exclusion for 
intentional acts.” (citing James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application 
of Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected 
by Insured, 31 A.L.R.4TH 957, 971 (1984))).
44. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
46. See United Rental Equip. Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 376 A.2d 1183, 
1187 (N.J. 1977) (“When an insurance carrier puts in issue its coverage of a loss under a 
contract of insurance by relying on an exclusionary clause, it bears a substantial burden of 
demonstrating that the loss falls outside the scope of coverage.”); see also supra note 30 and 
accompanying text.  
47. Compare Coregis Ins. Co. v. Elizabeth Township, No. 205cv582, 2007 WL 
1005599, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2007) (“To determine whether an insured intended the 
harm, courts apply a subjective standard.”), and Royal Indem. Co. v. Soneco/Ne., Inc., 183 
F. Supp. 2d 526, 533-34 (D. Conn. 2002) (determining intent for the intentionality exclusion 
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There are a number of variations of the objective standard.  Under one variation, 
the question is whether a “reasonable” person would have expected the injury at 
issue.49 Under another variation, the question is whether the policyholder knew or 
“requires the Court to apply a subjective standard”), and U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. 
Armstrong, 479 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Ala. 1985) (“[T]he legal standard to determine whether 
the injury was either expected or intended . . . is a purely subjective standard.”), and Fire Ins. 
Exch. v. Berray, 694 P.2d 191, 194 (Ariz. 1984) (explaining that the court looks “from the 
standpoint of the insured” to determine whether the insured “expected or intended” to cause 
injury), and Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 861 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1993) (rejecting the objective “should have known” meaning of “expect” and instead 
adopting the word’s “plain meaning”), and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 925 
P.2d 785, 794 (Colo. 1996) (rejecting the insurer’s “objective viewpoint” argument and 
addressing the issue from the viewpoint of the insured), and Williams v. City of Baton 
Rouge, 98-1981, pp. 19-20 (La. 4/13/99); 731 So. 2d 240, 253 (“The subjective intent of the 
insured . . . will determine whether an act is intentional.” (internal quotation mark omitted)), 
and Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. 1992) (“[T]he subjective intent 
of the insured is the key and not what the average or ordinary reasonable person would 
expect or intend.”), and Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, 469 N.E.2d 797, 800 (Mass. 
1984) (“Our cases have concluded that an injury is nonaccidental only where the result was 
actually, not constructively, intended . . . .”), and Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 
426 A.2d 888, 892 (Me. 1981) (adopting a subjective standard and recognizing it as the 
majority standard), and Arco Indus. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 531 N.W.2d 168, 179 
(Mich. 1995) (concluding that the court of appeals should have adopted a subjective 
standard), overruled on other grounds by Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Masters, 595 
N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 1999), and Espinet v. Horvath, 597 A.2d 307, 309 (Vt. 1991) (upholding 
a subjective standard and rejecting use of an objective standard with respect to “inherently 
dangerous activity” where such activity was not explicitly excluded by the insurance policy), 
and Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 882 P.2d 703, 714 (Wash. 
1994) (holding that a subjective standard applies where a policy is silent and ambiguous on 
whether the standard should be objective or subjective), modified by 891 P.2d 718 (Wash. 
1995), and Farmers & Mechs. Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Cook, 557 S.E.2d 801, 807 (W. Va. 
2001) (“[C]ourts must use a subjective rather than objective standard for determining the 
policyholder’s intent.”), with Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 717 n.2 (8th 
Cir. 1981) (using an objective standard to determine if damages were “expected”), and City 
of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1979) (using an 
objective standard of “knew or show have known” in determining if a result was 
“expected”), and In re Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 870 F. Supp. 1293, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1992) 
(“Texas law determines an insured’s intention ‘objectively’ and not ‘subjectively.’”), and W. 
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Waisanen, 653 F. Supp. 825, 830 (W.D.S.D. 1987) (using a range of 
forseeability to “inject[] varying degrees of objectivity into the test”). See also OSTRAGER &
NEWMAN, supra note 27, § 8.03[c], at 658-64). 
48. See cases cited in support of a subjective standard supra note 47.  
49. See, e.g., Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 717 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(“[I]n determining whether the damages were expected under the terms of the policy the 
appropriate standard to be applied is an objective one, i.e., whether a reasonable man in the 
position of the insured would have expected the damage to occur.”); City of Carter Lake v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1059 (8th Cir. 1979) (asking, for purposes of 
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should have known that there was a “substantial probability” its actions would result 
in the injury at issue.50 “Substantial probability” has been defined as whether “a 
reasonably prudent man” would be aware the adverse “results are highly likely to 
occur.”51
An obvious criticism of the objective standards is that they are not based on the 
policy language, which speaks in terms of whether the policyholder “expected or 
intended” the damage, not whether a “reasonable person” should have expected it.52  
Further, a “should have known” standard could eliminate coverage for many 
negligence claims simply because many accidents are reasonably foreseeable.  In the 
words of then New York Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo, “[t]o restrict 
insurance to cases where liability is incurred without fault of the insured would 
reduce indemnity to a shadow.”53 Or, in the words of the Second Circuit, “to exclude 
all losses or damages which might in some way have been expected by the insured, 
could expand the field of exclusion until virtually no recovery could be had on 
insurance.”54  
determining coverage, “[i]f the insured knew or should have known that there was a 
substantial probability that certain results would follow his acts or omissions”); In re Tex. E. 
Transmission Corp., 870 F. Supp. 1293, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (applying Texas law and 
explaining that the objective standard focuses on “what the insured knew or should have 
known”); W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Waisanen, 653 F. Supp. 825, 830 (W.D.S.D. 1987) 
(applying a spectrum of foreseeability); see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 27, 
§ 8.03[c], at 658-64.
50. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 27, § 8.03[c], at 658. 
51. City of Carter Lake, 604 F.2d at 1059 n.4; see also King v. Hartford Life & 
Accident Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 994, 1002 (8th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing between standards of 
“reasonably foreseeable” and “substantial probability” and expressing, “the latter requires 
not only that a reasonably prudent person would be alerted to the possibility of results 
occurring, but that such a reasonable person would be forewarned that the results are ‘highly 
likely to occur’” (quoting City of Carter Lake, 604 F.2d at 1059 n.4)).
52. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dichtl, 398 N.E.2d 582, 588 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(rejecting insurance company’s argument to read in a “reasonableness standard,” noting that 
if the insurer, who drafted the policy language, “wanted an objective standard to apply, it 
could have drafted its policy accordingly”); James Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 278-79 (Ky. 1991) (“Policies do not define 
‘expected’ and ‘intended’ but those are common words and they clearly indicate subjective 
awareness.”); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), 
(explaining that the common meaning of “expected” “connote[s] an element of conscious 
awareness on the part of the insured”).
53. Messersmith v. Am. Fid. Co., 133 N.E. 432, 432 (N.Y. 1921).  Such a view 
would also violate the principle that an insured’s reasonable expectations should be 
protected. See United Servs., 517 A.2d at 991 (“We do not believe that a layman would 
reasonably expect that as a result of the inclusion of such a phrase [i.e., “expected”] in his 
insurance contract he might not be insured for negligent acts.  These are the very acts which 
insurance is purchased against.”).
54. City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir. 
1989); see also Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 735 n.6 (Minn. 1997) 
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Consequently, for reasons such as these, the majority view is that a subjective 
standard should be applied.55 Under this approach, the actual intent of the 
policyholder is examined rather that what some fictitious “reasonable person” knew 
or should have foreseen.  Thus, coverage is only precluded where the insurer can 
prove the policyholder actually expected or intended to cause the damage at issue.56
2.  The Resulting Damage, Not the Causative Act, Must Be Expected or Intended
In most instances, the policyholder intends to engage in the conduct, such as the 
construction work, that gives rise to the damage.  Thus, what exactly must the 
policyholder expect or intend before the claim is excluded from coverage?  Most 
jurisdictions follow the rule that the damage must be expected or intended, not merely 
the act itself, before coverage is lost for the claim.57 With that said, in some contexts, 
courts have interpreted this standard to mean that if some injury or damage is 
expected or intended, then coverage is precluded even if the injury or damage at issue 
is different than what the policyholder expected or intended.58
(rejecting a “purely objective test” as inconsistent with the prior interpretations of the term 
“unexpected” and as “undermin[ing] coverage for injuries caused by simple negligence, a 
result we sought to avoid in prior cases”).
55. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 30, 48 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sparks, 493 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1985) (explaining that the intentional injury exclusion applied only where the insured 
intended both an act causing damage and the results of that act); Hanover Ins. Co. v. 
Talhouni, 604 N.E.2d 689, 690-91 (Mass. 1992) (“The focus in these cases is whether the 
insured ‘intended’ the injury, not whether the insured ‘intended’ the act.”); White v. Smith, 
440 S.W.2d 497, 508 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (explaining that, although some damages are 
foreseeable, “damages not intentionally inflicted but resulting from an insured’s negligence 
. . . may be caused by accident and within the coverage afforded by a liability insurance 
policy” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 609 N.E.2d 
506, 510 (N.Y. 1993) (“Resulting damage can be unintended even though the act leading to 
the damage was intentional.  A person may engage in behavior that involves a calculated risk 
without expecting that an accident will occur.” (citations omitted)); Grand River Lime Co. v. 
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 289 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (recognizing that the term 
“occurrence” is broader than the term “accident” and may encompass a fully intended action 
that resulted in unintended damage); Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Singleton, 446 S.E.2d 417, 420-21 
(S.C. 1994) (explaining that an intentional injury exclusion did not bar coverage where the 
insured had not intended the injury resulting from his voluntary act).
58. See Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 148 P.3d 438, 439 (Colo.  
App. 2006) (explaining that the intentional act exclusion applies “‘whenever some injury is 
intended, even though the injury that actually results differs in character or degree from the 
injury actually intended’” (emphasis added) (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 
816 P.2d 952, 955 (Colo. 1991))); Butler v. Behaeghe, 548 P.2d 934, 939 (Colo. App. 1976) 
(holding in an assault case that where the insured “intentionally struck the plaintiff, he must 
be deemed to have intended the ordinary consequences of his voluntary actions”); Ga. Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Purvis, 444 S.E.2d 109, 110 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that an 
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Other courts have held, however, that coverage is not precluded if the 
policyholder expected an injury or damage that was different or significantly less 
severe than what actually occurred.59 This is the sounder approach because a 
policyholder should not be required to forfeit coverage for a claim if the policyholder 
did not intend to cause significant damage, but it occurs nonetheless.
In the context of corporate policyholders, determining who must expect or intend 
the injury or damage is a more complex issue.  Corporations act through people.  
Thus, whose knowledge or expectation should dictate whether the corporation 
expected or intended the injury or harm?  In many instances, an employee of the 
corporation may have expected or intended the injury or damage, but the 
management or executives of the corporation had no knowledge of the employee’s 
actions, and therefore, they did not expect or intend any harm.
For example, consider a situation in which a seasonal, hourly employee of a 
roofing subcontractor, unbeknownst to the corporation’s management, intentionally 
fails to install ice shield on a roof because he forgot to put the ice shield on his truck 
that day and he did not want to drive back to the shop to retrieve it.  Subsequently, 
during a harsh winter, ice dams form on the roof and water infiltrates the house, 
causing substantial damage.  Did the corporation expect or intend to cause the 
damage in light of the fact that its employee knowingly failed to install the ice shield?  
In other contexts, courts have answered questions like this in the negative because the 
knowledge or intent of the corporation’s management should be considered instead of 
the seasonal employee’s knowledge or intent.60
intentional act exclusion is applicable where “‘the insured acts with the intent or expectation 
that . . . injury occur, even if the actual, resulting injury is different either in kind or 
magnitude from that intended or expected’” (omission in orginal) (quoting Stein v. Mass. 
Bay Ins. Co., 324 S.E.2d 510, 511-12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985))); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Johnson, 466 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (“Once intended harm is established, 
the fact of an unintended injury is irrelevant.”); Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. of Neb. v. Kment, 658 
N.W.2d 662, 668 (Neb. 2003) (“In order for the intentional or expected injury exclusion in a 
liability insurance policy to apply, the insurer must show that the insured acted with the 
specific intent to cause harm to a third party, but does not have to show that the insured 
intended the specific injury that occurred.”); see also 1 LONG, supra note 27, § 1.08[2][b][ii], 
at 1-82 to -83; OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 27, § 8.03[d], at 664-65; Rigelhaupt, supra 
note 43, at 990-91.
59. See, e.g., Yount v. Maisano, 627 So. 2d 148, 152 (La. 1993) (“‘[W]hen minor 
injury is intended, and a substantially greater or more severe injury results, whether by 
choice, coincidence, accident, or whatever, coverage for the more severe injury is not 
barred.’” (quoting Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 614 (La. 1989))); United Servs. 
Auto. Ass’n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 988 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“Our interpretation affords 
maximum coverage to insured persons as coverage is precluded only for harm of the same 
general type as that which they set out to inflict.”). 
60. See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 762 F. Supp. 548, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (concluding that, in determining whether the corporation expected or intended the 
harm, the dispositive facts were “what [the policyholder’s] executives knew, when they 
knew it, and what conclusions they drew from their knowledge”), aff’d, 966 F.2d 718 (2d 
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III.  COURTS’DETERMINATIONS OF WHETHER CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS ARE 
“OCCURRENCES”
A. The Weedo Case
A seminal case regarding the issue of whether construction defects are covered 
under CGL policies is the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1979 opinion in Weedo v. 
Stone-E-Brick, Inc.61  In Weedo, a subcontractor was hired to pour a concrete floor on 
a veranda and apply stucco to the exterior of a home.62 Soon after the job was 
completed, cracks in the stucco appeared and “other signs of faulty workmanship” 
manifested such that the homeowner had to replace the stucco.63 The homeowner 
sued the contractor, and the contractor tendered the claim to its CGL insurer.64 The 
insurer denied coverage on the basis that CGL policies allegedly do not cover claims 
for faulty workmanship.65
The CGL policy at issue stated that the insurer agreed to pay “on behalf of the 
insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of . . . bodily injury . . . or property damage to which this insurance applies,
caused by an occurrence . . . .”66 The policy also contained the 1973 standard form 
“business risk” exclusions, including Exclusions (n) and (o):
This insurance does not apply
(n)  to property damage to the named insured’s products arising out of such 
products or any part of such products;
(o)  to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named insured 
arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or 
equipment furnished in connection therewith.67
In rejecting the subcontractor’s claim for coverage, the court reasoned:
Regardless of the existence of express warranties, the insured’s provision of 
stucco and stone “generally carries with it an implied warranty of 
merchantability and often an implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose.” . . . Where the work performed by the insured-contractor is faulty, 
Cir. 1992); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Kenway Contracting, Inc., 240 S.W.3d 663, 639 (Ky. 
2007) (explaining that coverage analysis involves determining the intentions and 
expectations of corporate officers, not lower level employees). 
61. 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979).




66. Id. at 790 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
67. Id. at 791-92 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
FRENCH.REIC1 12/12/2011  12:12:42 PM
2011/12] CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS 23
either express or implied warranties, or both, are breached.  As a matter of 
contract law the customer did not obtain that for which he bargained. . . . [A] 
principal justification for imposing warranties by operation of law on contractors 
is that these parties are often “in a better position to prevent the occurrence of 
major problems” in the course of constructing a home than is the 
homeowner. . . . The consequence of not performing well is part of every 
business venture; the replacement or repair of faulty goods and works is a 
business expense, to be borne by the insured-contractor in order to satisfy 
customers.68
To support its decision, the court cited to and relied on a 1971 law review article 
by then Nebraska law school professor, Roger C. Henderson, regarding the changes 
made in 1966 to the standard CGL policy form with respect to the “business risk” 
exclusions for products liability and completed operations.69 In particular, the court 
quoted the portion of the article in which Professor Henderson opined:
“The risk intended to be insured is the possibility that the goods, products or 
work of the insured, once relinquished or completed, will cause bodily injury or 
damage to property other than to the product or completed work itself, and for 
which the insured may be found liable.”70
The court also pointed to the “business risk” exclusions in the policy at issue in the 
case and stated that:
given the precise and limited form of damages which form the basis of the 
claims against the insured, either exclusion is, or both are, applicable to exclude 
coverage.  In short, the indemnity sought is not for “property damage to which 
this insurance applies.”71
There are several notable points regarding the court’s analysis in Weedo.  One, 
the court did not quote the definition of “occurrence” in the policy at issue and failed 
to analyze whether the faulty stucco work constituted an “occurrence.”72 Two, the 
court did not quote the definition of “property damage” in the policy at issue and 
failed to analyze whether the faulty stucco work was “property damage” or caused 
68. Id. at 790-91 (citations omitted).
69. See id. (citing Roger C. Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability 
and Completed Operations – What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 418, 
441 (1971)).
70. Id. at 791 (quoting Henderson, supra note 69, at 441).
71. Id. at 792 (quoting George H. Tinker, Comprehensive General Liability 
Insurance—Perspective and Overview, 25 FED’N INS. COUNS. Q. 217, 233 (1975)). 
72. See id. at 790 n.2 (explaining that the court would not address whether, in light of 
the policy’s stated exclusions, coverage extended to the claims at issue, because the insurer 
had already conceded that “but for the exclusions in the policy, coverage would obtain”).
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“property damage.”73 Three, Professor Henderson’s law review article, on which the 
court relied, also did not analyze or address the issues of whether construction defects 
constitute “occurrences” or “property damage.”74 Instead, Professor Henderson’s 
article focused on the “business risk” exclusions contained in the 1966 CGL policy 
form, then offered the professor’s own unsupported conclusions regarding the intent 
of the exclusions.75 Four, the “business risk” exclusions at issue in the case were 
redrafted in 1986 to provide much narrower reductions in coverage.  Thus, Professor 
Henderson’s 1971 law review article is of little value in understanding or applying the 
“business risk” exclusions that are at issue today.76
Following the 1986 changes to the “business risk” exclusions, one would expect 
that the Weedo decision and Professor Henderson’s 1971 law review article would 
have become obsolete because they address “business risk” exclusions that are no 
longer used.  Nonetheless, as is discussed below, the Weedo decision and Professor 
Henderson’s article continue to surface from time to time, particularly in decisions 
where the court misapprehends the issue before it.77
B.  The Case Law Since Weedo
In recent years, courts have split in their holdings regarding whether construction 
defects constitute “occurrences.”78 Currently, the majority rule is that construction 
73. See id. at 790.
74. See Henderson, supra note 69.
75. See id. at 438-41.
76. See discussion supra Part I.D.
77. See, e.g., Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. 
Co., 908 A.2d 888, 889 n.10 (Pa. 2006).
78. Compare French v. Assurance Co. of Am., 448 F.3d 693, 706 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(applying Maryland law and holding that “a standard 1986 commercial general liability 
policy form . . . . provides liability coverage for the cost to remedy unexpected and 
unintended property damage to the contractor’s otherwise nondefective work-product caused 
by the subcontractor’s defective workmanship”), and Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Woodside 
Homes Corp., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1283 (D. Utah 2006) (applying Utah law and declaring 
that, among the various approaches to the issue at hand,  “the better-reasoned approach, and 
the approach that is most consistent with Utah law, views faulty subcontractor work as an 
occurrence from the standpoint of the insured”), and Fejes v. Alaska Ins. Co., 984 P.2d 519, 
522-23 (Alaska 1999) (standing for the general proposition that improper or faulty 
workmanship constitutes an accident), and Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Pozzi Window Co., 984 
So. 2d 1241, 1249 (Fla. 2008) (concluding that a policy provided coverage for costs to repair 
damage to windows caused by a subcontractor’s defective installation), and U.S. Fire Ins. 
Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 883 (Fla. 2007) (concluding defective soil work done 
by a subcontractor that caused damage to homes was an “occurrence” under CGL policies), 
and Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Hathaway Dev. Co., 707 S.E.2d 369, 372 (Ga. 
2011) (“[A]n occurrence can arise where faulty workmanship causes unforeseen or 
unexpected damage to other property.”), and U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 
578 N.E.2d 926, 932 (Ill. 1991) (concluding that damage to a building caused by installation 
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of asbestos was a covered “occurrence”), and Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. 
Co., 137 P.3d 486, 493 (Kan. 2006) (“[D]amage occurring as a result of faulty or negligent 
workmanship constitutes an occurrence as long as the insured did not intend for the damage 
to occur.” (internal quotation mark omitted)), and Joe Banks Drywall & Acoustics, Inc. v. 
Transcon. Ins. Co., 32,743, p. 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/2000); 753 So. 2d 980, 983 (standing 
for the general proposition that improper or faulty workmanship constitutes an “occurrence” 
within the meaning of a general commercial liability policy), and Architex Ass’n v. 
Scottsdale Ins. Co., 2008-CA-01353-SCT (¶ 33) (Miss. 2010), 27 So. 3d 1148, 1162 (“[T]he 
term ‘occurrence’ cannot be construed in such a manner as to preclude coverage for 
unexpected or unintended ‘property damage’ resulting from negligent acts or conduct of a 
subcontractor, unless otherwise excluded or the insured breaches its duties after loss.”), and
High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 478 (N.H. 1994) (finding that 
property damage to condominium units caused by defective workmanship was an 
“occurrence” within the meaning of the CGL policy), and Erie Ins. Exch. v. Colony Dev. 
Corp., 736 N.E.2d 941, 947 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (“[W]e find that the [insured’s] allegations 
of property damage caused by [the contractor’s] negligence in constructing and designing the 
condominium complex reasonably fall within the policy’s definition of property damage 
caused by an occurrence,—i.e., an accident.”), and Corner Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. 
Co., 2002 SD 5, ¶ 29, 638 N.W.2d 887, 894-85 (affirming the lower court’s ruling that 
construction defects resulting in ventilation problems constituted an accident and that such 
damage was covered by the policy at issue), and Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Moore & 
Assocs., Inc., 216 S.W.3d 302, 310 (Tenn. 2007) (“[D]efective installation [of windows] 
resulted in water penetration . . .  [and] constitute[d] ‘property damage’ for purposes of the 
CGL.”), and Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 2007) 
(concluding that damage to the insured’s work, as well as damage to a third party’s property, 
can result from an occurrence as defined in the CGL policy, but that no basis exists in the 
definition of “occurrence” to distinguish between the two), and Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶ 5, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 26, 673 N.W.2d 65, 70 (holding that 
excessive settlement of soil, which occurred after the building was completed, and which 
caused the building’s foundation to sink, was ‘“property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ 
within the meaning of the CGL policies’ general grant of coverage”), with Burlington Ins.
Co. v. Oceanic Design & Constr., Inc., 383 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Hawaii 
law and explaining that “[g]eneral liability policies . . . are not designated to provide 
contractors and developers with coverage against claims their work is inferior or defective” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)), and Lenning v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 
574, 583 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Kentucky law and declaring “there is no ‘occurrence’ to 
the extent that [a] complaint alleges property damage arising out of defective or faulty 
craftsmanship”), and J.Z.G. Res., Inc. v. King, 987 F.2d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying 
New York law for the proposition that “mere faulty workmanship, standing alone, cannot 
constitute an occurrence” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and U.S. Fid. & Guar. Corp. 
v. Advance Roofing & Supply Co., 788 P.2d 1227, 1233 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (“[M]ere 
faulty workmanship, standing alone, cannot constitute an occurrence as defined in the policy, 
nor would the cost of repairing the defect constitute property damages.”), and Gen. Sec. 
Indem. Co. of Ariz. v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. App. 2009) 
(“[C]laims of poor workmanship, standing alone, are not occurrences that trigger coverage 
under CGL policies similar to those at issue here.”), and State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Tillerson, 777 N.E.2d 986, 991 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“Where the defect is no more than the 
natural and ordinary consequences of faulty workmanship, it is not caused by an accident.”), 
and Pursell Constr., Inc. v. Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Iowa 1999) 
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defects constitute “occurrences,” with the Supreme Courts of the States of Alaska,79
Florida,80 Georgia,81 Indiana,82 Kansas,83 Minnesota,84 Mississippi,85 South 
(“[D]efective workmanship standing alone, that is, resulting in damages only to the work 
product itself, is not an occurrence under a CGL policy.”), and Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. 
Home Pride Cos., 684 N.W.2d 571, 578 (Neb. 2004) (“[A]lthough a standard CGL policy 
does not provide coverage for faulty workmanship that damages only the resulting work 
product, if faulty workmanship causes bodily injury or property damage to something other 
than the insured’s work product, an unintended and unexpected event has occurred, and 
coverage exists.”), and ACUITY v. Burd & Smith Constr., Inc., 2006 ND 187, ¶¶ 23, 27, 29, 
721 N.W.2d 33, 40, 42 (concluding that damages to a roof that a contractor was replacing 
were excluded from coverage because to hold otherwise would convert the policy into a 
performance bond, but damages resulting from a defective roof to the apartment interior was 
covered under the policy), and Heile v. Herrmann, 736 N.E.2d 566, 568 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1999) (concluding that faulty workmanship is not an “accident” and therefore not an 
“occurrence”), and Oak Crest Constr. Co. v. Austin Mut. Ins. Co., 998 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Or. 
2000) (“[T]here can be no ‘accident,’ within the meaning of a commercial liability policy, 
when the resulting damage is merely a breach of contract.”), and Kvaerner Metals Div., 908 
A.2d at 899 (“[T]he definition of ‘accident’ required to establish an ‘occurrence’ under the 
policies cannot be satisfied by claims based upon faulty workmanship.”), and L-J, Inc. v. 
Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 621 S.E.2d 33, 37 (S.C. 2005) (finding that “faulty 
workmanship does not constitute an ‘occurrence’”), and Corder v. William W. Smith 
Excavating Co., 556 S.E.2d 77, 83 (W. Va. 2001) (“[C]ommercial general liability policies 
are not designed to cover poor workmanship.”).
79. Fejes v. Alaska Ins. Co., 984 P.2d 519, 525 (Alaska 1999) (“[A]n insured has
coverage for his completed work when the damage arises out of work performed by someone 
other than the named insured, such as a subcontractor . . . .” (omission in original) (quoting 
Fireguard Sprinkler Sys., Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1988))).
80. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 888 (Fla. 2007) (concluding 
that the “subcontractors’ defective soil preparation,” which caused damage to homes, was an 
“occurrence” under CGL policies).
81. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Hathaway Dev. Co., 707 S.E.2d 369, 372 
(Ga. 2011) (“[A]n occurrence can arise where faulty workmanship causes unforeseen or 
unexpected damage to other property.”).
82. Sheehan Constr. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 935 N.E.2d 160, 171-72 (Ind. 2010) 
(concluding that the subcontractors’ defective work was a covered “occurrence”), modified 
on other grounds, 938 N.E.2d 685.
83. Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 137 P.3d 486, 493, 495 (Kan. 
2006) (agreeing with the appellate court that the “damage occurring as a result of faulty or 
negligent workmanship constitutes an occurrence as long as the insured did not intend for the 
damage to occur” (quoting Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 104 P.3d 997, 
1002 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005))).
84. Wanzek Constr., Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 679 N.W.2d 322, 325-27 (Minn. 
2004) (acknowledging earlier decisions based upon Professor Henderson’s 1971 law review 
article were incorrectly decided because the “business risk” exclusions were changed in 
1986).
85. Architex Ass’n v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 2008-CA-01353-SCT (¶ 33) (Miss. 2010), 
27 So. 3d 1148, 1162 (concluding that “the term ‘occurrence’ cannot be construed in such a 
manner as to preclude coverage for unexpected or unintended ‘property damage’ resulting 
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Carolina,86 South Dakota,87 Tennessee,88 Texas,89 and Wisconsin90 all finding in 
favor of policyholders on the issue.91 A minority of state supreme courts have held 
that, under the facts of the cases presented to them, construction defects were not 
covered by CGL policies.92  
Generally, the decisions fall under one or more of the following five schools of 
thought: (1) construction defects are “occurrences” so long as the damage was not 
expected or intended by the policyholder,93 (2) construction defects are “occurrences” 
from negligent acts or conduct of a subcontractor, unless otherwise excluded or the insured 
breaches its duties after loss”).
86. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Newman, 684 S.E.2d 541, 545-46 (S.C. 2009) (finding 
defectively installed stucco resulted in a covered occurrence), adhered to, Crossman Cmties. 
of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., No. 26909, 2011 WL 3667598 (S.C. Aug. 22, 
2011) (publication forthcoming); see also Act of May 17, 2011, No. 26, § 1, 2011 S.C. Acts 
88, 88-89 (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-61-70) (providing that CGL “policies shall 
contain or be deemed to contain a definition of ‘occurrence’ that includes . . . property 
damage or bodily injury resulting from faulty workmanship, exclusive of the faulty 
workmanship itself”).
87. Corner Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 2002 SD 5, ¶ 29, 638 N.W.2d 887, 
894-95 (concluding that construction defects resulting in ventilation problems constituted an 
“accident” and such damage is covered by the policy at issue).
88. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Moore & Assocs., Inc., 216 S.W.3d 302, 310 
(Tenn. 2007) (concluding that the defective installation of windows causing alleged water 
damage “constitute[s] ‘property damage’ for purposes of the CGL”).
89. Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 2007) 
(explaining that damage to the insured’s work as well as damage to a third party’s property 
can result from an “occurrence” as defined in commercial general liability policy; no basis 
exists in the definition of “occurrence” to distinguish between the two).
90. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶ 5, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 26, 
673 N.W.2d 65, 70 (holding that excessive settlement of soil, which caused the building’s 
foundation to sink, was “‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ within the meaning of 
the CGL policies’ general grant of coverage”).
91. Several states have preemptively passed statutes essentially mandating that 
construction defects are “occurrences.” See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-155(a) (Supp. 2011); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-808(3) (2010); Act of May 17, 2011, No. 26, § 1, 2011 S.C. Acts 
at 88-89.
92. See, e.g., Essex Ins. Co. v. Holder, 261 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Ark. 2008) (concluding 
that damages due to faulty workmanship are “foreseeable” and therefore, not covered), 
superseded by statute, H.R. 1439, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ark. 2011) (enacted) 
(codified at ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23-79-155(a) (Supp. 2011)); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Motorists 
Mut. Ins. Co., 306 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Ky. 2010) (explaining that construction defects are not 
fortuitous events); Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. 
Co., 908 A.2d 888, 899 (Pa. 2006) (“[T]he definition of ‘accident’ required to establish an 
‘occurrence’ under the policies cannot be satisfied by claims based upon faulty 
workmanship.”); Corder v. William W. Smith Excavating Co., 556 S.E.2d 77, 83 (W. Va. 
2001) (“[C]ommercial general liability policies are not designed to cover poor 
workmanship.”).
93. See cases cited supra notes 79-90 and cases cited infra note 122.
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to the extent property other than the work performed by the policyholder is 
damaged,94 (3) construction defects are not “occurrences” because they are not 
“accidents,”95 (4) construction defects are not “occurrences” because to hold 
otherwise would transform insurance into surety or performance bonds,96 and (5) 
construction defects are not “occurrences” because they are due to intentional acts 
from which the resulting damage is a foreseeable consequence.97
1.  Courts Holding Construction Defects Are “Occurrences”
As noted above, the majority rule currently is that construction defects constitute 
“occurrences.”98 In recent years, numerous cases favoring policyholders have been 
decided.99 The courts have reached these decisions by applying the definition of 
“occurrence” contained in CGL policies to the facts at issue and determining it was 
undisputed that the policyholder did not expect or intend to do the work defectively 
or cause the resulting damage.100 The Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in United 
States Fire Insurance Co. v. J.S.U.B, Inc.101 is a leading example of the courts’ 
reasoning on this issue.
In J.S.U.B., the policyholder was a contractor that built several houses in 
Florida.102 After the houses were finished and the homeowners took possession of 
them, the homeowners discovered that there was damage to the houses’ foundations, 
drywall, and other interior parts.103 The parties agreed that the “subcontractors’use of 
poor soil and improper soil compaction and testing” caused the damage to the 
houses.104 The homeowners sued the contractor/policyholder asserting claims for 
“breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, strict liability, and violation of the 
Florida Building Code.”105
The CGL policy at issue contained the standard form definitions of “occurrence” 
and “property damage” discussed in Part I of this article.106 Consequently, the term 
“accident” contained in the definition of “occurrence” was undefined.107
94. See cases cited infra note 145.
95. See cases cited infra note 146.
96. See cases cited infra note 175.
97. See cases cited infra note 187.
98. See cases cited supra notes 79-91 and cases cited infra note 122.
99. See cases cited supra notes 79-91 and cases cited infra note 122.
100. See cases cited supra notes 79-91 and cases cited infra note 122.
101. 979 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2007).





107. Id. at 883.
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Although the insurer agreed to cover the personal property of the homeowners 
that was damaged due to the defective construction work, the insurer argued that 
faulty workmanship itself “can never be an ‘accident’ because it results in reasonably 
foreseeable damages.”108 The insurer also argued that “a breach of contract can never 
result in an ‘accident,’”109 and that allowing recovery under insurance policies for 
defective construction work would convert “the policies into performance bonds.”110  
Finally, the insurer argued that it would be against public policy to allow recovery 
under insurance policies for construction defects because of the “moral hazard” that 
such a precedent would create (i.e., policyholders would have no incentive to perform 
their work competently).111  
The Supreme Court of Florida rejected all of the insurer’s arguments and held 
there was coverage for the claims.112 In doing so, the court first rejected the notion 
that the determination of whether the policyholder “expected or intended” the 
damage is based on whether the damage was objectively foreseeable, stating as 
follows:
The policy . . . in this case define[s] an “occurrence” as an “accident” but 
leave[s] “accident” undefined.  Thus, under [prior Florida precedent], these 
policies provide coverage not only for “accidental events,” but also injuries or 
damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. . . . We 
expressly rejected the use of the concept of “natural and probable consequences” 
or “foreseeability” in insurance contract interpretation . . . .113
Second, the court rejected the argument that damages resulting from a breach of 
contract cannot be an accident:
“[T]here is nothing in the basic coverage language of the current CGL policy to 
support any definitive tort/contract line of demarcation for purposes of 
determining whether a loss is covered by the CGL’s initial grant of coverage.  
‘Occurrence’ is not defined by reference to the legal category of the claim.  The
term ‘tort’does not appear in the CGL policy.”114
108. Id. at 876, 883.
109. Id. at 884.
110. Id. at 887.
111. Id. at 890.
112. Id. at 883-85 (rejecting the argument that it is reasonably foreseeable and, thus, 
never an “accident,” for a subcontractor’s defective work to damage the contractor’s own); 
id. at 887 (rejecting the argument that interpreting “occurrence” as including a 
subcontractor’s faulty work would turn CGL policies into performance bonds); id. at 889 
(rejecting the argument that a subcontractor’s faulty work renders a whole project damaged 
from the beginning so that “property damage” never actually occurs in construction defect 
cases).
113. French, 979 So. 2d at 883 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Id. at 884 (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶ 41, 
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Third, the court rejected the argument that allowing the policyholder to recover
under its insurance policy would convert the insurance policy into a performance 
bond:
[W]e reject [the insurer’s] contention that construing the term “occurrence” to 
include a subcontractor’s defective work converts the policies into performance 
bonds. The purpose of a performance bond is to guarantee the completion of the 
contract upon default by the contractor.  Thus, unlike an insurance policy, a 
performance bond benefits the owner of a project rather than the contractor.  
Further, a surety, unlike a liability insurer, is entitled to indemnification from the 
contractor.115
Fourth, the court rejected the theoretical public policy argument that allowing 
insurance recoveries for construction defects would create a “moral hazard”:
In reaching this conclusion, we discern no public policy reason for precluding 
coverage.  A subcontractor’s defective work that is neither intended nor expected 
from the standpoint of the insured is not the type of intentional wrongful act that 
we have held was uninsurable as a matter of public policy.  Even if a “moral 
hazard” argument could be made regarding the contractor’s own work, the 
argument is not applicable for the subcontractors’ work . . . .  “[I]t is as a 
practical matter very difficult for the general contractor to control the quality of 
the subcontractor work.  Only if the contractor has a supervisor at the elbow of 
each subcontractor at all times can quality control be relatively assured—but this 
would be prohibitively expensive.”116
Fifth, the court rejected the argument that only property that has been damaged 
separately from the defective work itself is recoverable “property damage”:
[J]ust like the definition of the term “occurrence,” the definition of “property 
damage” in the CGL policies does not differentiate between damage to the 
contractor’s work and damage to other property.117  
[W]e reject a definition of “occurrence” that renders damage to the insured’s 
own work as a result of a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship expected, but 
renders damage to property of a third party caused by the same faulty 
workmanship unexpected.118
268 Wis. 2d 16, 40, 673 N.W.2d 65, 77).
115. Id. 887-88 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. at 890 (citation omitted) (quoting STEMPEL, supra note 25).
117. Id. at 889.
118. Id. at 885.
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Sixth, the court considered the Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc.119 decision and 
noted that the “business risk” exclusions at issue in that case were the pre-1986 
“business risk” exclusions; thus, the case was of no precedential value.120
Finally, the court noted that the “business risk” exclusions themselves prove that 
construction defects are understood to constitute “occurrences”:
“If . . . losses actionable in contract are never CGL “occurrences” for purposes of 
the initial coverage grant, then the business risk exclusions are entirely 
unnecessary. . . .  Why would the insurance industry exclude damage to the 
insured’s own work or product if the damage could never be considered to have 
arisen from a covered “occurrence” in the first place?”121
Numerous other courts have adopted the J.S.U.B court’s analysis or reached 
similar decisions prior to when J.S.U.B. was decided such that the Supreme Court of 
Florida’s holding in J.S.U.B. now represents the majority rule.122
119. 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979).
120. J.S.U.B., 979 So. 2d at 881-83.
121. Id. at 886-87 (first omission in original) (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Am. Girl Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶ 47, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 43, 673 N.W.2d 65, 78).
122. See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Woodside Homes Corp., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 
1283 (D. Utah 2006) (applying Utah law and declaring that, among the various approaches 
to the issue at hand,  “the better-reasoned approach, and the approach that is most consistent 
with Utah law, views faulty subcontractor work as an occurrence from the standpoint of the 
insured”); Fejes v. Alaska Ins. Co., 984 P.2d 519, 522-23 (Alaska 1999) (standing for the 
general proposition that improper or faulty workmanship constitutes an accident); Auto-
Owners Ins. Co. v. Pozzi Window Co., 984 So. 2d 1241, 1249 (Fla. 2008) (concluding that a 
policy provided coverage for costs to repair damage to windows caused by a subcontractor’s 
defective installation); Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Hathaway Dev. Co., 707 
S.E.2d 369, 372 (Ga. 2011) (“[A]n occurrence can arise where faulty workmanship causes 
unforeseen or unexpected damage to other property.”); Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co., 137 P.3d 486, 493 (Kan. 2006) (“[D]amage occurring as a result of faulty or 
negligent workmanship constitutes an occurrence as long as the insured did not intend for the 
damage to occur.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Joe Banks Drywall & Acoustics, Inc. 
v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 32,743, p. 4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/00); 753 So. 2d 980, 983 (standing 
for the general proposition that improper or faulty workmanship constitutes an “occurrence” 
within the meaning of a general commercial liability policy); Architex Ass’n v. Scottsdale 
Ins. Co., 2008-CA-01353-SCT (¶ 33) (Miss. 2010), 27 So. 3d 1148, 1162 (“[T]he term 
‘occurrence’ cannot be construed in such a manner as to preclude coverage for unexpected or 
unintended ‘property damage’ resulting from negligent acts or conduct of a subcontractor, 
unless otherwise excluded or the insured breaches its duties after loss.”); High Country 
Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 478 (N.H. 1994) (finding that property damage to 
condominium units caused by defective workmanship was an “occurrence” within the 
meaning of the CGL policy); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Colony Dev. Corp., 736 N.E.2d 941, 947 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (“[W]e find that the [insured’s] allegations of property damage caused 
by [the contractor’s] negligence in constructing and designing the condominium complex 
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2.  Courts Holding Construction Defects Are “Occurrences” if Property Other than 
the Work at Issue Was Damaged
A number of courts have held that construction defects are “occurrences” only if 
property other than the work at issue was damaged.  The Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
French v. Assurance Co. of America123 is an example of this line of thought. 
In French, homeowners contracted with the policyholder for the construction of 
a home in Virginia.124 The policyholder hired a subcontractor to install synthetic 
stucco onto the home’s exterior.125 Almost five years later, extensive water damage 
resulted from the defective stucco installation.126 The homeowners spent over 
$500,000 to correct the defective construction and to fix the resulting damage to the 
other parts of their home.127 The homeowners, as assignees of the contractor’s rights 
under the policy, sued the contractor’s CGL insurer.128  
The insurer denied coverage, arguing that the property damage was “expected or 
intended.”129 The CGL policies at issue contained the standard form definitions of 
“occurrence” and “property damage” discussed in Part I of this article.130  
In analyzing the coverage issues, the court divided the homeowner’s property 
damage claim into two categories.131 The first category included the defectively 
reasonably fall within the policy’s definition of property damage caused by an occurrence,—
i.e., an accident.”); Corner Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 2002 SD 5, ¶ 29, 638 
N.W.2d 887, 894-95 (affirming the lower court’s ruling that construction defects resulting in 
ventilation problems constituted an accident and that such damage was covered by the policy 
at issue); Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Moore & Assocs. Inc., 216 S.W.3d 302, 310 
(Tenn. 2007) (“[D]efective installation [of windows] resulted in water penetration . . .  [and] 
constitute[d] ‘property damage’ for purposes of the CGL.”); Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-
Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 2007) (concluding that damage to the insured’s 
work, as well as damage to a third party’s property, can result from an occurrence as defined 
in the CGL policy, but that no basis exists in the definition of “occurrence” to distinguish 
between the two); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶ 5, 268 Wis. 2d 
16, 26, 673 N.W.2d 65, 70 (holding that excessive settlement of soil, which occurred after 
the building was completed, and which caused the building’s foundation to sink, was 
‘“property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ within the meaning of the CGL policies’ 
general grant of coverage”).
123. 448 F.3d 693 (4th Cir. 2006). 




128. Id. at 699. 
129. Id. at 704. 
130. Id. at 697.
131. See id. at 703.
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installed stucco exterior.132 The second category included the other parts of the house 
damaged by water as a result of the defectively installed stucco exterior.133  
With respect to the first category of damages, the court held that the defectively 
installed stucco did not constitute an “accident” and, therefore, was not an 
“occurrence.”134 In reaching this conclusion, the court applied Maryland law and 
relied on Maryland precedent.135 The court explained its reasoning:
“[T]he obligation to repair the facade itself is not unexpected or unforeseen 
under the terms of the sales contract.  Therefore, the repair or replacement 
damages represent economic loss and consequently would not trigger a duty to 
indemnify under a CGL policy.”136  
In reaching its decision, the court failed to explain, however, why the defectively 
installed stucco allegedly did not constitute “property damage,” or why the defective 
stucco installation was not an accident from the perspective of the 
contractor/policyholder, who did not expect its subcontractor to apply the stucco 
deficiently.137 Instead, the court created a straw man argument that a contractor 
should expect that it will have to remedy faulty work done by its subcontractor,138
which is no different than saying a negligent driver who hits someone should expect 
that, as the driver, he or she will be required to compensate the victim.  Although the 
driver may expect that he or she will have liability under such circumstances, that 
expectation does not mean he or she expected or intended to cause the injury, which 
is the issue that must be decided under an “occurrence” analysis.
With respect to the damage to other parts of the house, the court inconsistently 
held that such damage was due to an “accident,” and as a result, was an “occurrence” 
under the CGL policy.139 In doing so, the court noted, “there does not appear even to 
be an allegation that [the contractor] either expected or intended that its 
subcontractor . . . would defectively install the [stucco] exterior on the . . . home.”140  
Further, the court emphasized that the other parts of the house would not have been 




135. Id. (citing Lerner Corp. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 707 A.2d 906, 912-13 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1998)).
136. Id. at 703 (alteration in original) (quoting Lerner, 707 A.2d at 911-12).
137. See id. at 703-04.
138. See id. at 703.
139. See id. at 704. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 704-05.
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In reaching its decision, the court pointed to the insurer’s admission that if a 
portion of the defectively installed stucco had fallen onto a car, or onto home 
furniture, then the CGL policy would have provided coverage: 
In this same vein, it is illogical to contend that had the defective [stucco] exterior 
on the . . . home failed and caused damage to the flooring inside the home or to 
the structural members of the house, neither of which was defective at 
completion of construction and certification for occupancy, coverage would not 
have been provided . . . .142
Finally, the court noted that allowing coverage for the costs to fix the other 
damaged parts of the house gave effect to the subcontractor exception found in the 
“business risk” exclusions discussed in Part I of this article:
“If the policy’s exclusion for damage to the insured’s work contains a proviso 
stating that the exclusion is inapplicable if the work was performed on the 
insured’s behalf by a subcontractor, it would not be justifiable to deny coverage 
to the insured, based upon the absence of an occurrence, for damages owed 
because of property damage to the insured’s work caused by the subcontractor’s 
work.  Reading the policy as a whole, it is clear that the intent of the policy was 
to cover the risk to the insured created by the insured’s use of a subcontractor.  
Moreover, if coverage were never available for damage to the insured’s work 
because of a subcontractor’s mistake, on the theory that there was no occurrence 
even under those circumstances, the foregoing subcontractor proviso to the 
exclusion for damage to the insured’s work would be meaningless, and if 
possible, policies should not be interpreted to render policy provisions 
meaningless.”143
In sum, the Fourth Circuit held that, under Maryland law, although insurance 
coverage is not available to a general contractor in order to fix faulty workmanship 
done by a subcontractor, insurance does cover the cost of fixing “unexpected and 
unintended property damage to the contractor’s otherwise nondefective work-product 
caused by the subcontractor’s defective workmanship.”144 Although it is not based 
on a correct analysis of what the policyholder must expect or intend before coverage 
is precluded with respect to the faulty workmanship itself (i.e., that the work 
intentionally was done deficiently), a number of other courts have reached decisions 
similar to the Fourth Circuit’s in the French case and allowed recovery for damaged 
property other than the faulty workmanship itself.145
142. Id. at 705.
143. Id. at 705-06 (quoting Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 104 P.3d 
997, 1003 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005)).
144. Id. at 706. 
145. See, e.g., Lexicon, Inc. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 2011) 
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3.  Courts Holding Construction Defects Are Not “Occurrences” Because They Are 
Not “Accidents”
A handful of courts have adopted the view that construction defects cannot be 
“accidents” and thus, they cannot be viewed as “occurrences” under the terms of 
CGL policies.146 An example of such a case is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
(explaining that “collateral damage” resulting from construction defects is considered an 
“occurrence”); Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Parkshore Dev. Corp., 403 F. App’x 770, 772 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“[C]onstruction defects resulting in consequential damage to the property 
itself could qualify as an ‘occurrence.’”); Stanley Martin Cos. v. Ohio Cas. Grp., 313 F. 
App’x 609, 614 (4th Cir. 2009) (concluding that any damage a subcontractor’s defective 
work caused to non-defective work constituted an occurrence); Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. 
JHP Dev., Inc., 557 F.3d 207, 218 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying Texas law and holding that the 
exclusion “bars coverage only for property damage to parts of a property that were 
themselves the subjects of defective work, and not for damage to parts of a property that 
were the subjects of only nondefective work by the insured and were damaged as a result of 
defective work by the insured on other parts of the property”); OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Metro 
Ready-Mix, Inc., 242 F. App’x 936, 940 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying Maryland law and holding 
that “coverage exists only to remedy unexpected and unintended property damage to the 
contractor’s otherwise nondefective work-product caused by the . . . defective workmanship” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 578 
N.E.2d 926, 932 (Ill. 1991) (concluding that damage to a building caused by the installation 
of asbestos in the building was a covered “occurrence”); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Home 
Pride Cos., 684 N.W.2d 571, 577 (Neb. 2004) (“[A]lthough faulty workmanship, standing 
alone, is not an occurrence under a CGL policy, an accident caused by faulty workmanship 
is a covered occurrence.”); High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 477-78 
(N.H. 1994) (explaining that faulty work in and of itself does not constitute an “occurrence” 
due to foreseeability, but damage resulting as a consequence of faulty work is covered under 
the policy); ACUITY v. Burd & Smith Constr., Inc., 2006 ND 187, ¶¶ 23, 27, 29, 721 
N.W.2d 33, 40, 42 (concluding that damages to a roof that a contractor was replacing were 
excluded from coverage because to hold otherwise would convert the policy into a 
performance bond, but damages resulting from the defective roof to the interior of the 
apartment was covered under the policy); Crossmann Cmties. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville 
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 26909, 2011 WL 93716, at *9 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011) (explaining that faulty 
work itself is not an “occurrence” but damage resulting from faulty work may be an 
“occurrence”), withdrawn on reh’g, No. 26909, 2011 WL 3667598 (S.C. Aug. 22, 2011) 
(publication forthcoming); see also Act of May 17, 2011, No. 26, § 1, 2011 S.C. Acts 88, 88-
89 (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-61-70) (providing that CGL “policies shall 
contain or be deemed to contain a definition of ‘occurrence’ that includes . . . property 
damage or bodily injury resulting from faulty workmanship, exclusive of the faulty 
workmanship itself”).  
146. See, e.g., Lyerla v. Amco Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting how 
Illinois law recognizes that “damage to a construction project resulting from construction 
defects is not an ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence’ because it represents the natural and ordinary 
consequence of faulty construction”); Hathaway Dev. Co. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 274 F. 
App’x 787, 791 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that the subcontractors’ faulty work was “an injury 
accidentally caused by intentional acts” (internal quotation marks omitted)); OneBeacon Ins. 
Co. v. Metro Ready-Mix, Inc., 242 F. App’x 936, 940 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen there is no 
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decision in Kvaerner Metals Division of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union 
Insurance Co.147
In Kvaerner, a manufacturing company entered into a contract to construct a 
coke oven battery for a steel company.148 The coke oven battery allegedly had 
numerous problems that the manufacturer failed to remedy, resulting in a lawsuit.149  
The coke oven battery manufacturer notified its insurer of the lawsuit and sought 
coverage under its CGL policies.150 The insurer denied coverage.151  
The CGL policies at issue contained the standard form definitions of 
“occurrence” and “property damage” discussed in Part I of this article.152 In denying 
coverage, the insurer argued that:
(1) the Policies only permitted coverage for allegations of “property damage” 
caused by an “occurrence,” which was defined by the Policies as an accident, 
and [the steel company] had not alleged that the [coke oven] Battery was 
property damage to otherwise nondefective parts of [a] building, there is no ‘accident’ or 
‘occurrence.’  In other words, coverage exists only to remedy unexpected and unintended 
property damage to the contractor’s otherwise nondefective work-product caused by the . . . 
defective workmanship.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Essex Ins. 
Co. v. Holder, 261 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Ark. 2007) (“Faulty workmanship is not an accident; 
instead, it is a foreseeable occurrence, and performance bonds exist in the marketplace to 
insure the contractor against claims for the cost of repair or replacement of faulty work.”); 
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Home Pride Cos., 684 N.W.2d 571, 577 (Neb. 2004) (“[A]lthough 
faulty workmanship, standing alone, is not an occurrence under a CGL policy, an accident 
caused by faulty workmanship is a covered occurrence.”); High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. 
Co., 648 A.2d 474, 477-78 (N.H. 1994) (explaining that faulty work in and of itself does not 
constitute an “occurrence” due to foreseeability, but damage resulting as a consequence of 
faulty work is covered under the policy); ACUITY v. Burd & Smith Constr., Inc., 2006 ND 
187, ¶¶ 23, 27, 29, 721 N.W.2d 33, 40, 42 (concluding that damages to a roof that a 
contractor was replacing were excluded from coverage because to hold otherwise would 
convert the policy into a performance bond, but damages resulting from the defective roof to 
the interior of apartment was covered under policy); Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., 
Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 899 (Pa. 2006) (“We hold that the 
definition of ‘accident’ required to establish an ‘occurrence’ under the policies cannot be 
satisfied by claims based upon faulty workmanship.  Such claims simply do not present the 
degree of fortuity contemplated by the ordinary definition of ‘accident’ or its common 
judicial construction in this context.”); Crossmann Cmties. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. 
Ins. Co., No. 26909, 2011 WL 93716, at *8 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011) (holding that the policy at 
issue does not provide coverage for faulty workmanship because faulty workmanship fails 
the “fortuity component” of the definition of “accident”), withdrawn on reh’g, No. 26909, 
2011 WL 3667598 (S.C. Aug. 22, 2011) (publication forthcoming).
147. 908 A.2d 888 (Pa. 2006). 
148. Id. at 890-91. 
149. Id. at 891.
150. Id. at 891-92.
151. Id. at 892.
152. See id. at 897.
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damaged by such an occurrence, and (2) even if [the steel company] alleged 
property damage caused by an occurrence, such damages were excluded under 
various “business risk/work product” exclusions in the Policies.153
The court agreed with the insurer’s first argument.154 Because “accident” was 
not defined in the policy, the court looked to Webster’s dictionary to understand the 
meaning of the term and then concluded that faulty workmanship is not an 
“accident”:
Words of common usage in an insurance policy are construed according to their 
natural, plain, and ordinary sense.  We may consult the dictionary definition of a 
word to determine its ordinary usage.  Webster’s II New College Dictionary 6 
(2001) defines “accident” as “[a]n unexpected and undesirable event,” or 
“something that occurs unexpectedly or unintentionally.”  The key term in the 
ordinary definition of “accident” is “unexpected.”  This implies a degree of 
fortuity that is not present in a claim for faulty workmanship.155  
In reaching its decision, the court cited and relied on Professor Henderson’s 1971 
law review article dealing with the 1966 business risk exclusions.156 Those 
exclusions, however, had not been used in CGL policies for over two decades and 
were not at issue in the case.  Thus, the court did not actually address the business risk 
exclusions that were at issue in its decision.157
The court also did not address the relevant issue under an “occurrence” 
analysis—whether the coke battery manufacturer expected or intended to 
manufacturer a defective piece of equipment.  In short, the court’s decision is 
conclusory and essentially devoid of reasoning.  Nonetheless, several other courts 
have reached similar conclusions.158  
4.  Courts Holding Construction Defects Are Not “Occurrences” Because To Hold 
Otherwise Would Transform Insurance into Surety or Performance Bonds
Some courts have been persuaded that the distinction between CGL policies and 
surety or performance bonds leads to the conclusion that construction defects are not 
153. Id. at 892.
154. Id. at 899. 
155. Id. at 897-98 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 899 n.10 (Henderson, supra note 70, at 441).
157. Id. The court also incorrectly concluded that a finding of coverage would 
convert the policy into a performance bond. Id. at 899.
158. See cases cited supra note 146.
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covered under CGL policies.159 An example of such a case can be found in Essex 
Insurance Co. v. Holder,160 decided by the Arkansas Supreme Court. 
In Holder, homeowners contracted with a building contractor to construct a new 
home.161 Although the decision does not discuss in detail the construction defects at 
issue, the homeowners sued the contractor for “breach of contract, breach of an 
express warranty, breach of implied warranties, and negligence.”162  
The policyholder/contractor asserted that because the term “accident” is 
undefined in the CGL policy, it should be liberally interpreted in its favor, thus 
covering the construction defects.163 The court rejected this argument and ruled in 
favor of the insurer.164  
Although the court acknowledged that several other jurisdictions have found that 
the use of the undefined term “accident” in CGL policies is ambiguous, the court 
stated that an insurance policy is not ambiguous simply because the term “accident” 
is undefined in it.165 The court then explained that the term “accident” is “‘an event 
that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation—an event that proceeds from 
an unknown cause, and therefore not expected.’”166
After defining an “accident” as an unforeseen event or an event with an 
unknown cause, the Holder court examined a federal district court case in which the 
court concluded that construction defects are not “accidents”:
[T]he contractor’s obligation to repair or replace its subcontractor’s defective 
workmanship could not be deemed unexpected on the part of the contractor, and 
therefore, failed to constitute an “event” for which coverage existed under the 
policy.167
The Holder court also reasoned that allowing insurance to cover construction 
defects would purportedly convert insurance policies into performance bonds:
“The purpose of a CGL policy is to protect an insured from bearing financial 
responsibility for unexpected and accidental damage to people or property.  It is 
not intended to substitute for a contractor’s performance bond, the purpose of 
which is to insure the contractor against claims for the cost of repair or 
159. See, e.g., Essex Ins. Co. v. Holder, 261 S.W.3d 456, 459-60 (Ark. 2007); 
Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 899.
160. 261 S.W.3d 456 (Ark. 2007).
161. Id. at 457.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 458.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 460.
166. Id. at 458 (quoting Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 534 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Ark. 1976)).
167. Id. at 459 (discussing Nabholz Constr. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
354 F. Supp. 2d 917 (E.D. Ark. 2005)).
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replacement of faulty work.  [Contractor] might have elected to purchase a 
performance bond to protect it from a known business risk that its subcontractor 
would not perform its contractual duties.  That [the contractor] has no remedy 
for its subcontractor’s default under its CGL policy is neither troublesome nor 
unexpected given the nature of the risk involved.”168
In many respects, the Holder decision suffers from the same analytical defects as 
the Kvaerner169 decision.  Both courts incorrectly framed the issue as whether it was 
foreseeable that the contractor would be liable for defective workmanship.170 That is 
not the correct issue to be decided under an “occurrence” analysis.  Of course it is 
foreseeable that one will be liable for the damages one causes.  The correct issue to 
analyze is whether the damage resulting from the accident was actually expected or 
intended by the contractor, not whether it was foreseeable that the contractor would 
be liable for the resulting damages.
Both courts also incorrectly stated that allowing insurance recoveries for faulty 
workmanship would convert CGL insurance policies into performance bonds.171  
Performance bonds protect the owner of the property and ensure that the work will be 
done timely.172 Insurance, on the other hand, protects the contractor against liabilities 
imposed on the contractor by third parties, such as the property owner.173 Further, 
whether a performance bond would also cover the loss is not relevant to an analysis 
of the policy’s language and whether the policy covers the loss.  The two types of 
agreements contain different language and protect different entities.  As such, they are 
as similar as apples and oranges.174  
Nonetheless, like the court in Holder, several other courts have mistakenly 
pointed to the distinction between CGL policies and performance bonds as a basis for 
holding that construction defects are not “occurrences.”175
168. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Nabholz Constr. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp. 2d 917, 922 (E.D. Ark. 2005)).
169. Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 
A.2d 888 (Pa. 2006).
170. See id. at 897-98; Holder, 261 S.W.3d at 458.
171. See Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 899; Holder, 261 S.W.3d at 459.
172. See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 887 (Fla. 2007).
173. Id.
174. Perhaps for such reasons, the Arkansas state legislature on March 23, 2011 
effectively nullified the precedential value of the Holder decision by requiring insurers to 
sell CGL policies that define “occurrence” to include “[p]roperty damage or bodily injury 
resulting from faulty workmanship.” See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-155(a)(2) (2011).
175. See, e.g., United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Boulder Plaza Residential, LLC, 633 F.3d 
951, 959 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining that to hold that construction defects are “occurrences” 
would “transform . . . [a] commercial general liability policy into a performance bond”); 
Lexicon, Inc. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[P]erformance 
bonds exist in the marketplace to insure the contractor against claims for the cost of repair or 
replacement of faulty work . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Breezewood of 
FRENCH.REIC1 12/12/2011  12:12:42 PM
40 GONZAGA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1
5.  Courts Holding Construction Defects Are Not “Occurrences” Because the 
Damages Are the Foreseeable Consequences of Intentional Acts
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Lexicon, Inc. v. ACE American Insurance Co. is 
an example of a court holding that construction defects are not “occurrences” because 
liability for faulty workmanship is the foreseeable consequence of intentional acts.176  
In Lexicon, a contractor used a subcontractor to construct several silos.177 Due to 
faulty welds, one of the silos collapsed and damaged nearby equipment.178 When the 
silo’s owner asserted a claim against the contractor, the contractor’s insurers refused 
to pay for the damage.179
The CGL policies at issue contained the standard form definitions of 
“occurrence” and “property damage” discussed in Part I of this article, which, of 
course, means the term “accident” contained in the definition of “occurrence” was not 
defined.180
In its decision, the Eighth Circuit addressed two principal arguments advanced 
by the insurers against a finding of liability: (1) it was foreseeable that the faulty 
Wilmington Condos Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co., 335 F. App’x 268, 
271-72 (4th Cir. 2009) (remarking that construction defects are the kind of business risks 
that are the purpose of performance bonds); Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. JHP Dev., Inc., 557 
F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Damage to an insured’s own work resulting from his faulty 
workmanship on it is usually covered by a performance bond, not a commercial general 
liability policy.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Pursell Constr., Inc. v. Hawkeye-Sec. 
Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d 67, 70-71 (Iowa 1999) (explaining that an insured’s “defective 
workmanship, standing alone, is not an occurrence” because “[t]he fortuity implied by 
reference to accident or exposure is not what is commonly meant by a failure of 
workmanship” and “[i]f the policy is construed as protecting a contractor against mere faulty 
or defective workmanship, the insurer becomes a guarantor of the insured’s performance of 
the contract, and the policy takes on the attributes of a performance bond” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); ACUITY v. Burd & Smith Constr., Inc., 2006 ND 187, ¶¶ 23, 27, 29, 721
N.W.2d 33, 40, 42 (concluding that damages to a roof that a contractor was replacing were 
excluded from coverage because to hold otherwise would convert the policy into a 
performance bond, but damages resulting from the defective roof to the interior of the 
apartment was covered under the policy); Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 899 (“We hold that the 
definition of ‘accident’ required to establish an ‘occurrence’ under the policies cannot be 
satisfied by claims based upon faulty workmanship. . . . To hold otherwise would be to 
convert a policy for insurance into a performance bond.”); Crossmann Cmties. of N.C., Inc. 
v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., No. 26909, 2011 WL 93716, at *10 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011) 
(explaining that the policy at issue does not provide coverage for faulty workmanship and 
noting that to hold otherwise would convert it into a performance bond), withdrawn on 
reh’g, No. 26909, 2011 WL 3667598 (S.C. Aug. 22, 2011) (publication forthcoming). 
176. 643 F.3d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 2011).
177. Id. at 424. 
178. Id. at 425.
179. Id.
180. See id.
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welds would damage the silo; and (2) “foreseeable risks are never an ‘accident’ or 
‘occurrence’ for purposes of a CGL policy . . . .”181
In addressing these arguments, the Eighth Circuit, applying Arkansas law, 
focused on whether it was foreseeable that faulty construction work would damage 
the silo and lead to additional property damage.182 The court held that “it was 
foreseeable that faulty subcontractor work would damage the silo, but not foreseeable 
that faulty subcontractor work would cause millions of dollars in collateral 
damage.”183 Consequently, the court denied coverage for the damage that it deemed 
foreseeable.184 The insurers were held responsible for the collateral damage that the 
silo collapse caused, but not for the damage to the silo itself.185
The Eighth Circuit got it partly right in Lexicon.  The court was correct to allow 
recovery for the additional property damage caused by the defective welds.  When 
properly framed, however, the issue regarding the faulty welds themselves should 
have been resolved by determining whether the policyholder actually expected or 
intended to construct faulty welds, not whether it was foreseeable that they were 
faulty or that faulty welds would cause damage.  In fairness to the Eighth Circuit, 
however, it was effectively precluded from reaching a different result under Arkansas 
law due to the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Essex Insurance Co. v.
Holder186 discussed above.  Thus, the Lexicon decision was incorrectly decided for 
essentially the same reasons the Holderdecision was incorrectly decided.  
Despite its analytical flaws, there are a handful of other decisions that have also 
improperly applied a “foreseeable consequence” rationale in their decision-
making.187  
181. Id. at 426. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 427.
184. Id. (citing Essex Ins. Co. v. Holder, 261 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Ark. 2007)).
185. Lexicon, 634 F.3d at 427 (citing Advanced Envtl. Recycling Techs. Inc. v. Am. 
Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 399 F. App’x 869, 873 (5th Cir. 2010)).
186. 261 S.W.3d 456 (Ark. 2007).
187. See e.g., Lyerla v. Amco Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying 
noting how Illinois law recognizes that “damage to a construction project resulting from 
construction defects is not an ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence’ because it represents the natural and 
ordinary consequence of faulty construction”); Hathaway Dev. Co. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 274 
F. App’x 787, 791 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that the subcontractors’ faulty work “was an 
injury accidentally caused by intentional acts” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Metro Ready-Mix, Inc., 242 F. App’x 936, 940 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(“[W]hen there is no property damage to otherwise nondefective parts of [a] building, there 
is no ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence.’  In other words, coverage exists only to remedy unexpected 
and unintended property damage to the contractor’s otherwise nondefective work-product 
caused by the . . . defective workmanship.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Holder, 261 S.W.3d at 460 (“Faulty workmanship is not an accident; instead, it is 
a foreseeable occurrence, and performance bonds exist in the marketplace to insure the 
contractor against claims for the cost of repair or replacement of faulty work.”); Pursell 
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IV.  HOW COURTS SHOULD BE ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER CONSTRUCTION 
DEFECTS ARE “OCCURRENCES”
A. Public Policy and the “Moral Hazard” Problem
As noted above when discussing United States Fire Insurance Co. v. J.S.U.B., 
Inc., the “moral hazard” problem is one of the theoretical bases cited for the 
proposition that CGL policies do not cover construction defects.188 The basic theory 
posits that a policyholder/contractor effectively would have little incentive to perform 
its work well if it were covered for the damages it caused to third parties.189  
Constr., Inc. v. Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d 67, 70-71 (Iowa 1999) (explaining that 
an insured’s defective workmanship standing alone is not a covered “occurrence” because 
“[t]he fortuity implied by reference to accident or exposure is not what is commonly meant 
by a failure of workmanship” and “[i]f the policy is construed as protecting a contractor 
against mere faulty or defective workmanship, the insurer becomes a guarantor of the 
insured’s performance of the contract, and the policy takes on the attributes of a performance 
bond” (internal quotation marks omitted)); High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 
474, 477-78 (N.H. 1994) (explaining that faulty work in and of itself does not constitute an 
“occurrence” due to foreseeability, but damage resulting as a consequence of faulty work is 
covered under the policy); Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial 
Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 899 (Pa. 2007) (“We hold that the definition of ‘accident’ 
required to establish an ‘occurrence’ under the policies cannot be satisfied by claims based 
upon faulty workmanship.  Such claims simply do not present the degree of fortuity 
contemplated by the ordinary definition of ‘accident’ or its common judicial construction in 
this context.”); Crossmann Cmties. of N.C., Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., No. 26909, 
2011 WL 93716, at *8 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011) (holding that the policy at issue does not provide 
coverage for faulty workmanship because faulty workmanship fails the “fortuity component” 
of the definition of “accident”), withdrawn on reh’g, No. 26909, 2011 WL 3667598 (S.C. 
Aug. 22, 2011) (publication forthcoming).
188. See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 890 (Fla. 2007).
189. See W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. W. World Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(Easterbrook, J., delivering the opinion of the court) (describing the moral hazard problem 
by stating that “[o]nce a person has insurance, he will take more risks than before because he 
bears less of the cost of his conduct”).  Numerous other commentators also have addressed 
the moral hazard problem.  See, e.g., Scott E. Harrington, Prices and Profits in the Liability 
Insurance Market, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 42, 47 (Robert E. Litan & 
Clifford Winston eds., 1988) (“Moral hazard is the tendency for the presence and 
characteristics of insurance coverage to produce inefficient changes in buyers’ loss 
prevention activities, including carelessness and fraud . . . .”); ROBERT H. JERRY, II &
DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 10[c][2], at 11 (4th ed. 2007) 
(“[T]he existence of insurance can have the perverse effect of increasing the probability of 
loss. . . . This phenomenon is called moral hazard.”); George L. Priest, The Current 
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987) (“Moral hazard 
refers to the effect of the existence of insurance itself on the level of insurance claims made 
by the insured. . . . Ex ante moral hazard is the reduction in precautions taken by the insured 
to prevent the loss, because of the existence of insurance.”); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics 
and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 338 n.117 (1990) 
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Examples of courts pointing to “moral hazard” concerns when denying coverage for 
insurance claims are most commonly found in the first party insurance context, such 
as a beneficiary who attempts to recover under a life insurance policy after murdering 
the named insured.190 Similarly, courts often enforce an insurer’s decision not to 
cover a property loss where the policyholder intentionally destroyed the insured 
property.191 The “moral hazard” concern underlying such decisions is more 
understandable in the first party context because the policyholder is arguably being 
encouraged to create the losses in order to recover insurance proceeds.
The same logic does not apply, however, in the construction defect context.  In 
addition to taking pride in a job well done, a contractor is incentivized to do its work 
well, despite the existence of liability insurance, in order to get paid for the work, 
obtain future work, and avoid claims and litigation.  If the work is not done right, the 
contractor will not be paid; nor will the contractor be hired again.  Further, even if the 
contractor is able to eventually recover from its insurer, very few litigants would 
describe litigation as a pleasant or valuable use of their time, particularly while they 
are trying to run a profitable construction business.
Moreover, proponents of the “moral hazard” theory do not point to any empirical 
evidence that a contractor actually reviews his or her insurance policy to determine 
whether the insurance will cover the resulting damage before proceeding to do a job 
(“‘Moral hazard’ is sometimes distinguished from ‘morale hazard,’ the former referring to 
deliberate acts like arson, the latter to the mere relaxation of the defendant’s discipline of 
carefulness.” (citing C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. & RICHARD M. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT 
AND INSURANCE 217 (4th ed. 1981))). 
190. See, e.g., New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Null, 605 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir. 1979) 
(“[T]he accepted rule that a life insurance policy is void ab initio when it is shown that the 
beneficiary thereof procured the policy with a present intention to murder the insured.”); 
Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass’n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1966) (explaining that a beneficiary cannot recover life insurance proceeds if he murders the 
insured); 1B APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 27, § 481, at 308 (“It has uniformly been 
held that a beneficiary under a contract of personal insurance who murders the insured 
cannot recover the policy benefits.”).  
191. See, e.g., 12 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 27, § 7031, at 147 (“[A]rson by 
the insured will prevent him from recovering.”); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 189, § 63A, 
at 441 (“If the insured intentionally causes damage to her own property, the loss is not 
covered. . . . Insureds should not receive coverage for destroying their own property.  
Otherwise, insureds would have an incentive in many instances to destroy their property and 
collect the proceeds.”); see also U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beltmann N. Am. Co., 695 F. Supp. 
941, 948 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (“A fire insurance policy issued to any one, which purported to 
insure his property against his own willful and intentional burning of the same, would 
manifestly be condemned by all courts as contrary to a sound public policy . . . .” (quoting 
Checkley v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 100 N.E. 942, 944 (Ill. 1913)).  One commentator refers to 
this problem as the “barn burning defense,” stating that “the insured who intentionally burns 
his own barn is not entitled to collect the insurance on it!” 1 WARREN FREEDMAN,
FREEDMAN’S RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 1:13, at 48-49 (6th ed. 1990).
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sloppily.  In short, “moral hazard” arguments in the context of construction defect 
claims are based solely on theory, not empirical evidence.
On the other hand, there are other more tangible public policies favoring 
insurance recoveries for construction defects.  For example, public policy favors 
compensating innocent victims.192 Thus, in situations where a homeowner would go 
uncompensated in the absence of the contractor’s insurance (e.g., the contractor is 
insolvent or judgment proof), public policy favors allowing the homeowner to 
recover insurance proceeds regardless of whether the contractor could have or should 
have done the work right in the first place.
Another competing public policy is the enforcement of contracts, such as 
insurance policies, in accordance with their express terms.193 Indeed, as one court 
correctly noted in the context of analyzing whether insurance should be allowed to 
cover intentional torts, “[t]here is more than one public policy.  One such policy is 
that an insurance company which accepts a premium for covering all liability for 
damages should honor its obligation.”194 Because insurers draft the language 
contained in their policies, they do not need courts to resort to “public policy” 
arguments to help the insurers avoid coverage for the types of claims the insurers do 
not want to insure.  The insurers can simply state in the insurance policy, in clear 
terms, the specific types of claims that are not covered.195 If the insurer fails to do 
that, then public policy favors enforcing the terms of the policy in favor of coverage.  
Courts that have rejected insurers’ “moral hazard” public policy arguments in 
other third party liability contexts have analyzed the issue similarly.  For example, 
some courts have questioned whether the inference that insurance stimulates 
192. See, e.g., Yousuf v. Cohlmia, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288 (N.D. Okla. 2010) 
(explaining that compensating a wrongdoer’s innocent victims outweighs the concern that 
the wrongdoer would unjustly benefit); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826 F. 
Supp. 155, 164-65 (E.D. Va. 1993) (concluding that compensating inncocent victims, where 
an insurance policy does not explicitly exclude coverage of intentional acts, outweighs 
public policy of not permitting coverage of intentional action); Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. 
Jungling, 654 N.W.2d 530, 541 (Iowa 2002) (“Compensating . . . innocent victims . . . 
outweighs the concern that [the wrongdoer] will unjustly benefit from coverage.”); Vigilant 
Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]here is great public 
interest in protecting the interests of the injured party.”).
193. Sch. Dist. for the City of Royal Oak v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844, 848-49 
(6th Cir. 1990) (explaining that public policy favors enforcing the terms of insurance policies 
and “common sense suggests that the prospect of escalating insurance costs and the trauma 
of litigation, to say nothing of the risk of uninsurable punitive damages, would normally 
neutralize any stimulative tendency the insurance might have”); Nw. Nat’l. Cas. Co. v. 
McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) (Gewin, J., concurring) (noting the public policy 
favoring the enforcement of contracts); Union Camp. Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp. 
565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (“Exercise of the freedom of contract is not lightly to be interfered 
with.  It is only in clear cases that contracts will be held void as against public policy.”).
194. Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
195. See cases cited infra note 198.
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undesirable behavior can overcome “the competing public policies which favor 
freedom of contract and the enforcement of insurance contracts according to their 
terms.”196 Other courts have pointed to the insurance industry’s own ability to 
discourage undesirable behavior.197 Such courts have noted that insurance companies 
are capable of policing their own policyholders and that insurance companies, as 
drafters of the policy language, have ample motivation to prevent policyholders from 
recovering for allegedly deliberate losses if they so desire.198
In sum, the courts that have rejected “moral hazard” public policy based 
arguments have done so for three primary reasons.  First, they have noted the lack of 
empirical evidence to support the assumption that insurance promotes bad 
behavior.199 Second, they have noted the competing public policies that favor the 
enforcement of an insurer’s agreement to provide coverage under its policies and the 
need to compensate victims.200 Third, they emphasize that insurers can, themselves, 
196. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 863, 
868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 
1005, 1010 n.1 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting)), aff’d, 515 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1994); 
see also Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 849.
197. See, e.g., Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 509 So. 2d 945, 948 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (“[T]he marketplace itself will discourage wrongful acts of 
discrimination.”), vacated, 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989); Indep. Sch. Dist., 495 N.W.2d at 
867 (“[C]ommon sense suggests that the prospect of escalating insurance costs and the 
trauma of litigation, to say nothing of the risk of uninsurable punitive damages, would 
normally neutralize any stimulative tendency the insurance might have.” (quoting Royal 
Oak, 912 F.2d at 848)).
198. See, e.g., Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 849 (“Had the company wished to exclude 
coverage for intentional religious discrimination in employment, it could and should have 
said so.”); Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 568 (“Continental and other insurers which have 
issued policies containing such clauses have not up to now conceived that they were 
violating public policy by writing insurance policies insuring against losses resulting from 
discriminatory employment practices.”); Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 947 (citing Union Camp, 452 
F. Supp. at 567-68); Univ. of Ill. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1350-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1992) (“[T]he insurer is an informed contracting party with no inferiority in bargaining 
position and should not be allowed to escape from the contract it freely entered into. . . . This 
court will not rewrite . . . policy to create an exclusion.”); Indep. Sch. Dist., 495 N.W.2d at 
868 (“The carrier is, of course, free to expressly provide an exclusion for such conduct in the 
future.”).
199. See, e.g., Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 947 (“The proposition that insurance taken out 
by an employer to protect against liability under Title VII will encourage violations of the 
Act is . . . speculative and erroneous.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826 F. Supp. 155, 164-65 (E.D. 
Va. 1993) (finding that public policy does not forbid patients from being compensated by 
doctor’s professional liability policy for doctor’s intentional insemination of them with his 
own sperm), aff’d, 48 F.3d 778 (4th Cir. 1995); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 
720 P.2d 540, 542 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that Arizona public policy favors 
compensating injured persons and victims of doctor’s sexual abuse can be compensated 
through his professional liability policy); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Shernow, 610 
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exclude coverage for specific types of claims, as they have done with the “business 
risk” exclusions.201 Insurers draft the policies; thus, they should not be permitted to 
avoid their contractual obligations by appealing to vague public policy concerns, such 
as the “moral hazard” problem, with the expectation that the courts will do for them 
what they failed to do for themselves when drafting the policies.
B. Applying the Rules of Policy Interpretation to the Issue
When one applies the relevant rules of insurance policy interpretation to the issue 
of whether construction defects constitute “occurrences,” the inescapable conclusion 
is that construction defects are “occurrences” unless the insurer can prove the 
policyholder actually expected or intended to do the construction work defectively 
and cause damage.  The term “accident” is not defined in standard form CGL 
policies.  As has been discussed above, courts have held that an “accident” essentially 
is an event that unexpectedly and unintentionally gives rise to injury or damage.202  
Contractors generally do not expect or intend to do their work defectively.  Further, 
under the doctrine of contra proferentem, to the extent there is any ambiguity in the 
A.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Conn. 1992) (finding that public policy does not prohibit indemnity for 
compensatory damages flowing from dentist’s intentional sexual assault of patient); Hudson 
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1168, 1171-72 (Del. 1990) (refusing to void coverage 
for intentional wrongdoing under an automobile policy, despite the public policy exclusion 
because of the competing public policy behind the state motor vehicle financial 
responsibility law); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1982) (allowing insurance recovery for a physician’s sexual assault of his patient because 
“[i]t is not the insured who will benefit, but the innocent victim who will be provided 
compensation for her injuries”); Indep. Sch. Dist., 495 N.W.2d at 868 (citing Ranger, 549 
So. 2d at 1010 n.1 (Ehrlich, C.J., dissenting)); S.S. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 808 
S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that a homeowner’s insurance policy 
provides coverage for the transmission of a sexually transmitted disease by relying on the 
analogous context of automobile insurance in which public policy favors the compensation 
of tort victims).  
201. See, e.g., Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 849 (“Had the company wished to exclude 
coverage for intentional religious discrimination in employment, it could and should have 
said so.”); Ranger, 509 So. 2d at 947 (“Continental and other insurers which have issued 
policies containing such clauses have not up to now conceived that they were violating 
public policy by writing insurance policies insuring against losses resulting from 
discriminatory employment practices.”) (quoting Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 568); Univ. 
of Ill., 599 N.E.2d at 1350-51 (“[T]he insurer is an informed contracting party with no 
inferiority in bargaining position and should not be allowed to escape from the contract it 
freely entered into. . . . This court will not rewrite . . . policy to create an exclusion.”); Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 495 N.W.2d at 868 (“The carrier is, of course, free to expressly provide an 
exclusion for such conduct in the future.”).
202. See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 883 (Fla. 2007).
FRENCH.REIC1 12/12/2011  12:12:42 PM
2011/12] CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS 47
meaning of “accident,” the courts must resolve those ambiguities in favor of the 
policyholder.203  
In addition, the “reasonable expectations” doctrine dictates that construction 
defects are “occurrences.”204 The reason a contractor buys CGL insurance is to 
protect itself against claims relating to its construction business.  Thus, a contractor 
reasonably expects that it will be covered for construction defect claims brought 
against it because those are among the most common types of claims asserted against 
contractors.  To hold otherwise would render the coverage provided under CGL 
policies largely illusory for contractors.  
Further, when one construes CGL policies as a whole, instead of in parts, 
construction defects must be “occurrences” in order for the “business risk” exclusions 
to have any purpose.  What would be the point of the “business risk” exclusions if 
construction defects were not “occurrences” in the first instance?  There would be no 
need to exclude coverage for “defects” in “your work” or have a subcontractor 
exception to such an exclusion if construction defects were not covered 
“occurrences” under the basic insuring agreement language.205
Moreover, under the definition of “occurrence” and the “expected or intended” 
exclusion contained in standard form CGL policies, property damage caused by the 
policyholder is covered unless the damage is “expected or intended” by the 
policyholder.206 Contrary to some courts’ holdings,207 the policy language does not 
state that property damage is not covered if it is the reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the policyholder’s actions.  Thus, whether the damage is reasonably 
foreseeable should not be part of the analysis because such a test lacks a basis in the 
“expected or intended” language or definition of “occurrence” found in CGL policies.  
The test is subjective, not objective, and the issue is whether the damage was actually 
“expected or intended” by the policyholder, not whether the damage was reasonably 
foreseeable.208  
In the same vein, the question of whether a contractor reasonably expects to be 
held liable for its negligence also should not be part of the analysis.  Of course 
contractors, like everyone else, expect to be held liable if their negligence causes 
injuries or damage.  Indeed, that is the reason people buy insurance.  Insurance is 
intended to cover the policyholder’s liabilities for injuries and damages that result 
from the policyholder’s negligence.  If reasonably foreseeable property damage and 
liabilities were not covered by CGL policies, then insurance for liabilities would 
become largely illusory in many situations because it is often reasonably foreseeable 
203. See discussion supra Part II.A.
204. See discussion supra Part II.B.
205. See, e.g., J.S.U.B., 979 So. 2d at 886-87; INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., supra note 2, 
§ I(2)(l) at 5.
206. See discussion supra Parts I.A, II.D.2.
207. See cases cited supra note 187.
208. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
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that negligent actions will lead to accidents, property damage, and ultimately 
liability.209
In sum, there should be little debate that construction defects are “occurrences” 
under CGL policies unless the contractor expected or intended to do the work 
defectively and cause damage.  Thus, in most cases, the analysis regarding whether 
construction defect claims are covered under CGL policies should focus on whether 
the “business risk” exclusions apply to the claim.
CONCLUSION
After years of misunderstanding the issue, many courts, such as the Supreme 
Court of Florida in United States Fire Insurance Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc.,210 are finally 
starting to understand the issue of whether construction defects are “occurrences,” 
and they are getting the analysis right.211  Construction defects are “occurrences” 
under standard form CGL policies.  
In determining whether there is an “occurrence” in the context of construction 
defects, the analysis should focus on whether there was an “accident” that gave rise to 
property damage.  Although the term “accident” is undefined in CGL policies, courts 
have generally defined it to mean a happening or an event that unexpectedly and 
unintentionally gives rise to an injury or property damage.212 Thus, unless the insurer 
can prove that the policyholder/contractor expected or intended its workmanship to 
be defective and cause property damage, the faulty workmanship was accidental and 
thus, an “occurrence.”
Such a conclusion is consistent with the rules of insurance policy interpretation.  
Those rules provide that policy language should be interpreted in such a way as to 
give effect to all of the provisions in a policy and to fulfill the reasonable expectations 
of the policyholder regarding the scope of coverage it has purchased, with any 
ambiguities in the policy language being resolved in favor of coverage.  Contractors 
who purchase CGL insurance to cover their businesses (i.e., construction) reasonably 
expect that they will receive coverage for third-party liability claims related to their 
businesses (i.e., construction defect claims), especially when one considers that the 
policies contain “business risk” exclusions that specify the particular types of work-
related claims that are not covered.  If construction defect claims were not 
“occurrences” in the first instance, then why would policies contain “business risk” 
exclusions or the subcontractor exception to such exclusions?  Finally, if construction 
defects were not “occurrences,” then the coverage provided to contractors under CGL 
policies largely would become illusory because the vast majority of claims asserted 
209. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
210. 979 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2007).
211. See cases cited supra notes 79-90, 122.
212. E.g., Fejes v. Alaska Ins. Co., Inc., 984 P.2d 519, 523 (Alaska 1999).
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against contractors would not be covered.  Such a result would be unfair and should 
not be permitted.
